Toward a Geography of Trade Costs by Hummels, David
Purdue University
Purdue e-Pubs
GTAP Working Papers Agricultural Economics
1-1-1999
Toward a Geography of Trade Costs
David Hummels
Purdue University
Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/gtapwp
This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for
additional information.



































What are the barriers that separate nations?  While recent work provides intriguing clues, 
we have remarkably little concrete evidence as to the nature, size, and shape of barriers. 
This paper offers direct and indirect evidence on trade barriers, moving us toward a 
comprehensive geography of trade costs.  There are three main contributions. 
 
One, we provide detailed data on freight rates for a number of importers.  Rates vary 
substantially over exporters, and aggregate expenditures on freight are at the low end of 
the observed range.  This suggests import choices are made so as to minimize 
transportation costs.  Two, we estimate the technological relationship between freight 
rates and distance and use this to interpret the trade barriers equivalents of common trade 
barrier proxies taken from the literature.  The calculation reveals implausibly large 
barriers.  Three, we use a multi-sector model of trade to isolate channels through which 
trade barriers affect trade volumes.  The model motivates an estimation technique that 
delivers direct estimates of substitution elasticities.  This allows a complete 
characterization of the trade costs implied by trade flows and a partition of those costs 
into three components: explicitly measured costs (tariffs and freight), costs associated 
with common proxy variables, and costs that are implied but unmeasured.  
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Trade barriers play a central role in models of international specialization and trade.
Much of the positive theory concerns the effects of barriers on trade, and trade costs figure
prominently in recent work that extends our understanding of the nature of specialization.  For
example, the unique insights of economic geography models depend critically on the size of
trade costs (Krugman (1991a)) and their distribution over goods (Davis (1998))1.  Brainard
(1998) and Markusen and Venables (1996) emphasize trade costs in examining substitution
between trade and foreign investment, and Hummels, Ishii and Yi (1999) highlight trade costs in
explaining the rise of vertical specialization.2  Trade costs may also play a role in policy
formation as the optimality of preferential trade arrangements depends on the size and shape of
"natural" trade barriers (Krugman (1991b)).  Of course, empirical evaluation of any model of
international specialization and trade must ultimately confront trade costs.  For example, Trefler
(1995) and Davis and Weinstein (1998a) propose trade costs as a primary explanation for the
celebrated absence of factor content in trade. Indeed, a better understanding of trade costs may
provide insights into a broad range of questions about international integration.
What then are the barriers that separate nations?  How large are they?  How much do they
vary across partner countries? While recent work provides intriguing clues, we have remarkably
little concrete evidence as to the nature, size, and shape of barriers. This paper argues that
progress toward a more nuanced understanding of these three issues rests on careful
measurement, and on starting that measurement in obvious places.
One can imagine a long list of barriers that plausibly affect international integration.
Beginning with tariffs, and proceeding to transportation costs, time, information, or more
esoteric explanations, it is not difficult to construct credible stories for any number of important
trade costs. The difficulty lies in directly measuring the purported cost and so researchers rely
primarily on indirect methods: positing a model of bilateral trade flows and correlating flows
with proxy variables meant to represent trade barriers.  It is well known that the volume of
bilateral trade diminishes sharply with the distance between trading partners, and that a shared
language and adjacency corresponds to greater trade flows. Several recent papers (McCallum
(1995), Helliwell (1996, 1997), and Wei (1996)) show that trade flows imply significant “home
                                                       
1 These are only two of the large number of papers on geography and trade.  In these models, geography effects are
generated by the interaction between increasing returns in production and trade costs.
2 Vertical specialization is simply trade in stages of production rather than final goods, and is also known as "slicing
up the value chain" or "fragmentation".
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bias” in consumption.  Thus, indirect methods suggest, language matters, borders matter, relative
location matters.3
While intriguing, these findings leave open several questions.  Chief among these is a
precise description of what these proxies capture and the size of the barrier.  Why exactly does
language matter? Similarity of preferences?  Minimizing search costs in foreign lands?  Do
distance and adjacency effects represent the costs of moving goods, or the cost of moving
information?  Do borders appear “thick” because they are truly costly to surmount?  To make
progress, this paper offers direct and indirect evidence on trade barriers, moving us toward a
comprehensive geography of trade costs.
Section II provides a set of stylized facts on directly measured trade barriers in the form
of detailed freight and tariff rate data. There are two main findings.  One, freight rates have
higher means and variances than tariff rates.   Two, aggregate expenditures on freight are on the
low end of a wide range of observed rates.  This suggests that the aggregate rates significantly
understate shipping costs borne by most exporters and that transportation costs play a significant
allocative role in bilateral trade. That is, aggregate freight expenditures are low because import
choices are made to minimize transport costs.
The next step is to formally assess the relative importance of freight costs in trade.
Section III describes the one-sector monopolistic competition model used to motivate most
indirect estimates of trade barriers and recounts evidence relating barrier proxies to trade
volumes.  This model identifies substitution as the primary channel through which barriers affect
trade: holding constant the locations of production, importers substitute away from goods with
relatively high trade costs.   Unfortunately, the use of proxies in place of direct cost data prevents
researchers from identifying the elasticity of substitution or the size of the trade barriers the
proxies represent.  We estimate the technological relationship between freight rates and distance
and use this to infer the elasticity of substitution and the trade barrier equivalents of common
proxies.  The resulting calculation reveals implausibly large barriers.
Section IV uses a multi-sector monopolistic competition framework to introduce an
additional channel through which barriers operate. Given substitution, production migrates to
minimize costs so that close neighbors produce complementary sets of goods.  This magnifies
the effects of barriers on trade volumes and may explain the large estimates from aggregate
models.
                                                       
3 This is by no means an exhaustive list of the proxies associated with bilateral trade flows, but they are perhaps the
most robust.
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Section V provides structural estimates of the multi-sector model that identify the
elasticity of substitution for each good, and the trade barrier equivalent for common proxy
variables. Attention to functional form and level of aggregation provides a potential method for
separating three alternative interpretations of what common proxies measure: trade barriers,
preferences, and production composition. In addition, the model provides a structural
interpretation of the regression residuals in terms of unobserved preference parameters (with an
implicit willingness-to-pay interpretation). This allows a complete characterization of the size
and shape of barriers, and a partition of these barriers into explicitly measured costs (freight plus
tariffs), costs captured by proxies, and unmeasured but implied costs. The evidence suggests that,
for many goods, explicitly measured costs are most of the story.
II.   Directly Measuring Trade Costs:  Stylized Facts on Freight and Tariff Rates
In this section we provide stylized facts on the level and variation of freight and tariff rates at
highly disaggregated commodity levels.  The data include imports of the US, New Zealand, and
five Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay) in 1994.  In
each case, customs officials collect data on import values, quantities (weights), and freight and
insurance charges for each entering shipment.  These are reported with exporter and commodity
detail with approximately 3000 goods for New Zealand and Latin American imports and over
15,000 goods for US imports. Additional detail on these data is provided in the appendix.
Table 1 and Figure 1 provide evidence on the level and distribution of freight rates for each
importer. In the trade data an observation includes the transportation expenditure F, and the
value of imports exclusive of these charges V, in a commodity l (measured at the 5-digit SITC








Table 1 displays ad-valorem freight rates, calculated both as trade-weighted and
unweighted average rates of all observations within a 2-digit SITC commodity group k (62
goods).  Summing freight expenditures and the value of trade separately over all export partners
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where S jl  is the value-share of an observation jl in bilateral trade for the 2-digit commodity k.
This rate is reported in the left panel of Table 1.  The right panel reports the unweighted average
freight rate over all observations within a 2-digit commodity k.    The weighted and unweighted
average freight rates will be equal if there is zero correlation between the observation freight rate
and the share of that observation in trade.
Several broad facts emerge from this table.  One, while aggregate expenditures on freight
are quite low (only 3.8 percent of trade value in the US, and somewhat higher for other
importers), rates for most goods are much higher.  Two, land-locked Paraguay stands out as
having exceptionally high freight rates.4  Three, freight rates are lower for manufactured goods
(SITC 5-9) than for commodities (SITC 0-4).  Four, in nearly all cases, the unweighted freight
rate is considerably higher than the trade-weighted freight rate.  That is, observations with the
lowest freight rates enjoy the largest share of trade.
Further evidence on the dispersion of freight rates is provided in Figure 1, which plots the
inner-quartile range of all observed freight rates (exporter x 5 digit SITC commodity) within
each two-digit group.5  The IQR is represented as a line (with the 25th and 75th percentiles as
endpoints), and the trade-weighted average freight rate for each commodity is circled.  The
figure indicates first, that there is wide variation of rates within each commodity category, and
second, that trade-weighted rates are on the lower end of a large range of observed rates.
Rates have been reported at the two-digit level for ease in display, but the basic patterns
revealed in Table 1 and Figure 1 persist at more disaggregated levels.  That is, considerable
variation in freight rates across exporters exists even for narrow product classifications. This
variation suggests that transportation costs could play an important allocative role in trade.
Further, exporters with the lowest freight rates in these narrow product classifications enjoy the
                                                       
4 Directly comparing rates across countries is somewhat tricky because of differences in valuation.  In particular,
loading expenses are included in US and New Zealand data, but not in Latin American data.
5 The inner-quartile range is used in place of the full range of observed rates to minimize the importance of
potentially mismeasured outliers.
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largest share of trade.  This fact suggests that transportation costs do play an allocative role –
aggregate freight expenditures are low because import choices are made so as to minimize
transport costs.
Figures 2 and 3 provide evidence on the level and variation of freight rates relative to
tariff rates.  We first compare the trade-weighted average freight and tariff rates.  Freight rates
are calculated as above.  Tariff rates are calculated by applying ad-valorem rates from schedules
in the TRAINS database to yield the duty owed on each observation.  This database includes
both MFN and preferential tariff rates and preferential rates are applied where appropriate.6
Summing duties owed over all exporters and commodities within a two-digit group and
expressing them as a ratio over the value of trade yields the trade-weighted average tariff rate.
Figure 2 reports the difference between the average freight and tariff rates.  For the US
and New Zealand, freight rates are substantially higher than tariff rates for all but a handful of
manufactured goods, where both rates are very low.  For Latin American countries, freight rates
are substantially higher than tariff rates for commodity categories, and the reverse for
manufactured goods.
Figure 3 compares the relative dispersion in freight and tariff rates by plotting the
difference in the size of the inner quartile ranges of observations within a two-digit group. For
example, in SITC 00 (Live Animals) in the US, the quartile freight rates are 25.6% and 5.6%
yielding an IQR of 20%, while the quartile tariff rates are 2.5% and 0% for an IQR of 2.5%.
This yields the plotted difference of 17.5%. If all countries were accorded MFN tariff status, the
tariff IQR would be zero.7 The figure makes clear that there is considerably more variation in
freight rates than in tariff rates. This is true even when mean tariffs are higher, as in the
Argentine and Brazilian manufacturing sectors.
We have seen above that unweighted mean freight rates are much higher than weighted
mean rates.  The same is not true of tariffs, because there is such little variation across exporters.
This means that in a comparison of unweighted means, freight rates are nearly always higher
than tariff rates. Again, these patterns persist when calculated at more disaggregated levels,
suggesting that it is exporter composition and not heterogeneity of goods within product
classifications that leads to these results.
                                                       
6 See appendix for details.
7 It will also be zero if tariff-preferred exporters lie entirely below the 25th percentile.
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III.  Indirectly Measuring Trade Costs in the One Sector Model
The preceding section suggests that transportation costs may play an important role in
allocating trade over partner countries.  The difficulty in assessing their relative importance lies
in measuring barriers we suspect may exist, but have no way of observing directly.  This requires
a model of trade.  A commonly invoked baseline model for evaluating bilateral trade barriers is
the one-sector monopolistic competition model and its companion, the gravity equation. As the
model is very well known we identify key features here and refer readers to the seminal work in
Krugman (1980).
In the usual formulation, utility is CES over varieties within a sector, and σ is the
elasticity of substitution between varieties.
U C jj= =
−∑( ( ) ) /θ θ θ σσ
1 1  where 
Assuming monopolistically competitive firms and iceberg transport costs leads to the following
results.   Each firm produces a unique variety so that it may have monopoly power over that
variety, expressed as the markup of price over marginal cost, p mc/ = −θ 1 .  The number of
varieties produced in each country is determined by the available labor force, the size of fixed
costs, and the substitution elasticity, n L aj j= / σ .  Variation in pricing across export markets is
determined entirely by the iceberg transport cost factor, so if pj is the exporter’s price exclusive
of trade barriers and tij ≥ 1 is the ad-valorem trade cost, the price faced by importer i is p p tj ij= .



















where P p ti l ill= ∑ −( )1 σ is a price index over all varieties purchased by importer i.  Demands are
symmetric for all varieties from j, so multiplying the quantity purchased by the number of
varieties and price of each variety leads to an expression for the volume of bilateral trade.
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Suppose trade costs tij rise.  In this model, production cannot adjust across sectors
because there is only one sector, and production will not adjust across varieties, because one
variety is just as good as another. The only role trade costs can play is to cause substitution
toward less expensive varieties, with the rate of substitution given by σ.
Estimates from the Literature
We are interested in three questions.  One, what cost components belong in the ad-
valorem trade barrier?  Two, how large is that barrier?  Three, what is the elasticity of
substitution between goods?   To answer the first question, researchers typically experiment by
including proxies for trade costs such as the distance between partners, and indicators for
common language and adjacency (when countries share land borders). Several studies also
include domestic “trade”, along with a variable to indicate flows that take place within a country.
McCallum (1995) and Helliwell (1996) use explicit data on trade between regions within Canada
as well as trade between Canadian regions and US states. Wei (1996) and Helliwell (1997)
measure the implied value of trade within OECD countries by netting exports from gross output.8
Implicit in these proxies is a relationship between the proxy variable and the ad-valorem
trade costs they represent.  Let ad-valorem trade costs increase in distance, according to
t d DISTij( ) ( )= δ1 , and denote the ad-valorem trade cost savings from common language,
adjacency, and not crossing national borders respectively as ( , , )δ δ δ2 3 4 .9  These proxies enter in
multiplicative form for ease in estimation, yielding a trade barrier function of
(3) t DIST lang adjij ij ij ij ij= + +( ) exp( )δ δ δ δ1 2 3 4home
                                                       
8 There are several difficulties in constructing the value of “home consumption” for these studies.  First, exports are
netted from gross output by taking GDP (value-added) and grossing it up by an aggregate gross-output/value-added
ratio.  This ignores substantial cross-sector variation in the ratio.  Second, there is no clearly correct way to measure
internal distances (how far is a country from itself?) without explicit intra-national flow data.  Since estimates are
very sensitive to these measurement issues, caution is urged in interpreting the results.
9 That is, indicators take a value of 1 when language and a land border are shared and when goods flows stay within
a country.  If these all correspond to the absence of barriers, the respective delta terms are negative indicating cost
savings.
9
Taking logs, and ignoring the price terms, we arrive at the estimating equation.
(4) ln ln lnM a a YY DIST lang adjij i j ij ij ij ij ij= +0 1 1 2 3 4+ +  +  + home +β β β β ε .
The trade barrier coefficients are interpreted as β δ σn n n= − =( ) ...   for 1 4 .  Common
estimates of these terms are collected in Table 2.  The first column is an estimate by the author of
a standard gravity equation using trade data taken from the Statistics Canada World Trade
Database.  The dependent variable is the value of bilateral imports, summed over all goods, for
all country pairs with positive values for trade.  Domestic consumption is excluded.  National
GDP’s, distance, and indicators for adjacency and common language are included in the
regression.  The second and third columns are taken from McCallum (1995) and Helliwell
(1997).10
While the econometric interpretation of the trade barrier coefficients is straightforward –
doubling distance halves trade, intra-national trade is 8 to 20 times larger than international trade
– the economic interpretation is not.  It is not clear whether costs rise rapidly with distance and
borders are very costly to surmount or whether goods are sufficiently close substitutes that small
cost differences yield large volume effects.  Similarly, the larger border effect measured by
McCallum may indicate that the US Canadian border is costlier to surmount than OECD borders
generally, or may indicate that US-Canadian products are closer substitutes. Without knowing σ
we cannot infer the size of the trade barrier, and without knowing the size of the barrier we
cannot infer σ.11
Estimating the Freight— Distance Relationship
The explicit freight data described in the previous section provide a way out of this
impasse.  Suppose that the distance term simply captures freight charges.  Using freight data we
can directly estimate δ1, the technological relationship between transportation costs and distance.
Combining this with the trade-distance relationship (β1) estimated from the import demand
                                                       
10 These are Table 1, column 2 and Table 2 column 3, respectively.
11 Several authors including Wei (1997) make this point, but lacking explicit trade cost data they cannot identify the
relevant elasticity.
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equations yields σ.  That in turn may be used to interpret the size of the trade barriers implied by
the other proxies.
We estimate the technological relationship between the ad-valorem freight rate and
distance with a log-linear function that includes distance shipped, importer intercepts, and the
weight to value ratio of the shipment to capture differences in transportability across goods.
Below, we experiment with different functional forms.











ij ijk= + + +β β1 2
We estimate (5) using three distinct data sets. First, we use US, New Zealand and Latin
American data pooled over all commodities and importers and estimate a common relationship
for all goods.  An observation consists of imports into importer i, from exporter j, in commodity
k (measured at the 5-digit SITC commodity level).12  In US and Latin American data, imports
from adjacent countries have been omitted for two reasons. One, without specific entry and exit
points, constructing shipping distance becomes extremely problematic for very close countries.
Two, in the Latin American data, transport costs are calculated only between the exporter’s exit
port and the importer’s entry port.  For shipments over land, these are the same and so freight
expenditures are registered as zero in the data.13
A second estimation uses only US import data but employs richer detail available from
that source. US Census data include detail on shipment mode (ocean, air, land) and ports of
entry.  This distinguishes imports entering Virginia from those entering Hawaii and allows a
more precise calculation of distance shipped. See appendix for details. An observation consists
of imports into port i from exporter j in commodity k, and (5) is estimated separately for ocean
and air transport.  As comparability in the level of aggregation is not an issue, we use all
observations at their most disaggregated (10 digit HS) level.
A third set of estimates employs data from the US Transborder Surface Freight database.
This includes, for over-land imports from Canada, the province of origin, the entry port and the
shipment mode (rail or truck).  This allows a reasonably precise calculation of distance shipped
for over-land travel.  An observation now consists of imports into entry port i from exporting
                                                       
12 US data are reported at much more disaggregated levels (10 digit HS).  These data are concorded to the 5-digit
SITC categorization for comparability with the other data.
13 Estimates that include adjacent partners along with an adjacency dummy yield similar distance coefficients.
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province j in commodity k, and (5) is estimated separately for rail and truck transport.  These
data have less commodity detail, providing disaggregation only to the 2-digit HS level (90
goods).
The first panel of Table 3 reports the pooled estimates, along with predicted freight rates
over varying distances for each importer (evaluated at the country mean weight/value ratio). We
find a precisely estimated distance elasticity of 0.27.  These are quite similar to those found in
much older studies using less extensive data.14
The second panel reports estimates for US data by transport mode.  Distance elasticities
vary over shipment mode in sensible ways – additional mileage is very expensive for air freight,
less so for ocean freight.  The estimates for air freight are very close to estimated distance
elasticities for air travel terminating in the US contained in the International Civil Aviation
Organization’s Air Cargo Survey, 1993.15  However the ICAO estimates much higher numbers
for air travel terminating in every other market, with distance elasticities as large as 1.0 and
greater.  This suggests that the US numbers are a lower bound.16
Also noteworthy in the US data are differences in levels of freight rates across modes.
Despite similar elasticities, land-based shipment incurs much lower overall charges.  A possible
explanation may be that when countries share a land border, truck and rail modes allow direct
point to point shipment and a minimum of costly mode switching.  It also provides a reasonable
explanation for the adjacency effect found in trade volume regressions.
We applied several robustness checks to these estimates and experimented with different
functional forms.  First, allowing commodity-specific distance coefficients in the pooled
regression yields distance elasticities tightly clustered in the 0.2 to 0.3 range.  Second, the
transportation technology for a particular vessel is almost certainly affine in distance.  The vessel
incurs some fixed costs of loading and unloading and marginal costs (fuel, manning) that are
very nearly linear in distance.  However, this shape is difficult to identify because the shipping
fleet is very heterogeneous, with small vessels (low fixed costs, high marginal costs) used for
short hauls, and larger vessels (larger fixed costs, lower marginal costs) used for longer hauls.
The data do not distinguish vessel type and so we observe a lower envelope of vessel costs, as
                                                       
14 See Lipsey and Weiss (1974) and Moneta (1959).
15 The ICAO surveys passenger and cargo air fares for a large number of origin and destination cities world-wide.
Descriptive statistics published in "Survey of Air Fares" include a regression of ln(air fare) for a 45 kg package on
ln(distance), pooled over all cities and for specific geographic route groups.
16 It also suggests that the distance coefficient may capture more than a technological relationship between rates and
distance.  Two additional candidates are selection (see robustness checks) and price discrimination is air markets
that are less competitive than the US.
12
represented in Figure 4.  Attempts to identify this shape with functional forms that allow non-
zero fixed costs or splines result in poor fit and nonsensical results.17
Finally, the evidence from Table 1 suggests that data censoring may be a problem.
Suppose that at any range of distance there is a set of available goods from which an importer
may select, and these goods exhibit some unobserved heterogeneity in their ad-valorem freight
rates.  At short distances, freight rates are sufficiently low that importers buy all available goods.
However, at longer distances freight rates may rise so as to prohibit trade entirely, and we will
not observe these rates in the trade data. This is illustrated in Figure 5 with observed rates
shaded.  OLS estimates of the freight-distance relationship may be biased downward by the
censoring and so a Heckman selection model is employed.  The first step estimates a probit
where the dependent variable is an indicator for bilateral trade (0 if no trade takes places between
importer i and exporter j in commodity k, and 1 otherwise).  Independent variables include
importer and exporter intercepts, distance shipped, and as an exogenous variable, the tariff rate
that would be applied to that flow.  Selection corrected coefficients are not significantly different
from OLS estimates in the pooled regression and yield no clear pattern in commodity-specific
regressions.18  We conclude from this that the Table 3 estimates are unaffected by selection bias.
Interpreting Estimates from the Literature
We now use the estimated technological relationship between freight and distance to
interpret the proxy variable coefficients in the one-sector estimates.  These are reported in the
second panel of Table 2.  For the simple gravity regression and the Helliwell regression we use
estimates on ocean and air freight distance elasticities from the US data as lower and upper
bounds, $ [. ,. ]δ1 22 46∈ .  For the McCallum data, we use estimates for truck and rail elasticities
for US and Canadian trade taken from the US Transborder Surface Freight Data to provide
bounds, $ [. ,. ]δ1 27 39∈ .
We solve for the implied substitution elasticity using $ $ / $σ β δ= − 1 1 .  This provides a range
from 2 to 5.26, depending on the particular estimates employed.   These elasticities have a direct
                                                       
17 Spline estimates, for example, yield line segments that are sharply decreasing in distance, or non-concave in
distance.
18 We estimate (5) separately for each commodity using OLS and a Heckman correction.  In comparing the distance
elasticities across specifications for 62 goods, half yielded no difference between the estimates, one-quarter yielded
slightly larger OLS coefficients, and the remaining quarter yielded slightly larger Heckman coefficients.
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interpretation in terms of both the effect of barriers on trade volumes and the monopoly markup
over marginal cost that firms may charge.  These estimates imply markups ranging from 23%
(for σ=5.26) to 100% (for σ=2).
We use the substitution elasticity to solve for the implied elasticities of trade costs with
respect to language, adjacency, and border crossing using $ $ / $δ β σi i= , and represent these in their
ad-valorem equivalent form by exponentiating the terms.  This yields enormous implied costs
from these barriers.  Not speaking a common language implies a barrier as high as 135% ad-
valorem, while non-adjacency raises prices by as much as 141%.  The border effects measured
by McCallum and Helliwell are astronomically expensive, adding about 200% to goods prices.
Note that the ad-valorem equivalent of the border is about the same when comparing the US-
Canadian versus OECD borders.  The US-Canadian border only looks thicker in a trade volume
sense because US and Canadian goods are much closer substitutes than OECD goods as a whole.
Finally, the Helliwell estimate also includes an indicator variable for EC countries, and its
interpretation implies that non-members face a tariff of 100%.
These enormous estimates suggest a plausibility check.  What barrier could language or
non-adjacency pose that has the effect of more than doubling the price of imports?  What
happens at borders to effectively increase prices three-fold?   The external tariff on EC members
is not nearly 100% so what else does this capture?  There are three potential explanations.  One,
the barriers really are that large.  Two, the technique is flawed.  Three, the proxy variables
capture something other than (or in addition to) barriers to trade.  We leave the reader to evaluate
the first explanation and take up the last two.
First, these barrier estimates hinge critically on the estimated substitution elasticities and,
judging by the sizable monopoly markup they imply, these seem too low.  This may be because,
when using aggregate data and the one sector model, we are assuming that cars and computers
and coal are symmetric substitutes.  Of course identifying σ requires the assumption that the
distance term proxies entirely for freight costs.    Rauch (1998) interprets the distance term as
measuring information costs.  If both freight and information costs are captured this may imply a
larger distance δ, a smaller σ, and therefore even larger implied barriers from language,
adjacency and home bias estimates.  Second, we rely entirely on the shape of the freight barrier,
while ignoring its level.  The technique would have given the same answers had freight barriers
been ten times as large.  Or, we could have as easily interpreted the distance term as proxying for
the cost of making an international telephone call, which rises with an eerily familiar distance
14
elasticity of 0.27.19  However relying wholly on the shape of the distance function follows from
taking seriously the multiplicative functional form for trade barriers employed in the literature.
In the following sections we provide estimates that address all these issues and determine
substitution elasticities directly from the regression structure.   We also provide insight into a
final explanation for large aggregate effects, that our proxy measures capture production
composition and preferences instead of (or in addition to) trade barriers.
IV.  Indirectly Measuring Trade Costs in the Multi-Sector Model
The one sector-model provides an overly simple characterization of the effect of barriers
on trade and implies costs that seem implausibly large.  This section introduces a multi-sector
framework that suggests another channel, an endogenous production response, through which
trade barriers affect trade volumes.














−∑( ( ) ) /θ θ θ σσ
1 1  and 
Xk is a CES aggregator over varieties in sector k, and the Cobb-Douglas shares α ik can be
country-specific. Sector expenditure shares are determined exogenously by preferences, while
the within-sector distribution of expenditures depends endogenously on relative prices.20  The
multi-sector version of the bilateral import demand equation looks similar to the one sector case.

























                                                       
19 Phone tariff rates available from OECD Communications Outlook, 1993.  A simple regression of ln(rate) on
ln(distance) yields a distance elasticity of 0.27.
20 An alternative explanation for the variation in sector expenditure shares arises from differences in the composition
of final goods production across countries and the resulting variation in demands for intermediate goods.  In this
case the expenditure shares are endogenously determined in general equilibrium.
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k= ∑ −( )1 σ is the price index for importer i in sector k. Iceberg transport cost
factors and substitution elasticities are sector-specific.  With n j
k  varieties available from exporter
j, multiplying the quantity purchased by the number of varieties and price of each variety leads to
an expression for the volume of bilateral trade
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Closing this model requires a solution for the number of varieties in each sector, that is,
the composition of output.  This is where multi-sector models with barriers become exceptionally
difficult. Krugman (1980) and Weder (1995) describe in very simple multi-sector models how
output responds endogenously to a “home market” effect.  In the presence of trade costs and
variation in expenditure shares, countries produce more of the goods for which home demand is
greater. Extending this argument to a multi-country framework, this becomes a “local market”
effect, in which countries produce more of the goods (n j
k  high) for which local ( tij
k low) demand
(α ik iY ) is highest.  Davis and Weinstein (1996, 1998) estimate these “home” and “local” market
effects in a simplified framework that relates production to idiosyncratic demand and
endowments.  They find large production responses to “local” market demand.21
In terms of the sector-level import demand equations above, the volume of trade depends
on trade barriers directly, through substitution, and indirectly, through their effect on production.
This magnifies the effect of trade barriers.   For example, if production possibilities are very
similar in the US and Canada then a small barrier induces a large production response.  Canadian
production is matched to Canadian consumption, with large resulting trade volume effects.22
One would like to separately identify and measure substitution and production location
effects.  However, this requires a fully described general equilibrium model that marries
exogenous explanations for specialization (technology, endowments) with endogenous home
                                                       
21 Davis and Weinstein obviate the need for a complicated model of economic geography by narrowly examining the
elasticity of sectoral output with respect to idiosyncratic local demand for that sector.  Models with constant returns
to scale suggest an upper bound of 1 (when the supply curve is flat).  They estimate an elasticity of 1.6, suggesting
strong geography effects.  However, equation (6) suggests it is necessary to control for production composition so
long as the elasticity is greater than zero.
22 This also suggests caution when pooling across multiple bilateral pairs. If each pair has a different relative cost
structure, production responses (and the trade volumes they induce) will vary even when the trade barrier is the
same.
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market effects. Such models quickly become intractable, yield little useful insight for empirical
work, and in any case they lie beyond the scope of the current paper. Our current interest lies
with measuring the size and shapes of trade barriers themselves, and this requires only
controlling for the production effect in order to measure the size of the substitution effect.









k is the output of each variety and γjk j jkY Y= where γjk is the share of output devoted to sector k,
and aggregate over all sectors.







































This expression bears some resemblance to the one sector model from equation (2).  The
difficulty comes in measuring, as a single variable, all the terms in the summation in equation
(7).  Indeed, it is not clear how one would construct such a summation as the included terms are
a mix of endogenous and exogenous factors and the researcher would need to know precisely
what one wants to estimate: the size of the trade barrier and the substitution elasticities.
Finally, suppose that importers prefer certain varieties within sector k.  That is, apart from
an overall division of expenditures on sectors (cars versus textiles), we allow differences in
utility gained from specific types of cars.  This can be represented by including preference
weights (bij
k ) in the CES sub-utility function for sector k.





k k= ∑( ( ) ) /θ θ1
We rewrite (6) to reflect the inclusion of preference weights as
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l= ∑ −( ) ( )σ σ1
The preference weights allow a straightforward interpretation in terms of the price premium an
importer will pay to make him indifferent between varieties (i.e. import the same volume).  Let c
denote the country to which importer i assigns the mean preference weight in that sector
(bic
k = 1).  Setting equal i’s imports from j and c and solving for the price premium we have
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k k k/ ( )( )/d i= −σ σ1   or  ln / ln( ) / ( )p p bjk ck k ijk kd i= −σ σ 1
If a variety is preferred (bj>1), then the importer will pay a higher price and still import the same
amount.
V.  Evidence from the Multi-Sector Model
In this section we estimate sector-level import demand equations using explicit data on
freight and tariff rates.  The goal here is not merely to provide estimates loosely motivated by the
model from the previous section, but to implement the model in a careful structural way. This
provides several benefits.  One, it allows us to identify the elasticity of substitution between
goods. Two, it provides a meaningful interpretation of common proxy variables in terms of their
ad-valorem trade barrier equivalent and in terms of implied preferences (and willingness to pay)
for specific varieties of goods.  Three, attention to the functional form and level of aggregation
provides a possible method for distinguishing competing explanations of what precisely common
proxy variables capture.  Four, it provides an interpretation for regression residuals in terms of
their price premium equivalents.  This allows us a check on the appropriateness of the underlying
structural model that is more directly useful than standard measures of regression fit.
Estimation Technique
Taking logs of equation (6),











k= + + − − −α σ σ1
There are two problems with empirical implementation. The first is measuring “true” trade costs,
tij
k .  The second is measuring everything else.  We begin with the latter.
 Output, expenditure shares, prices, and the price index are unmeasured. The omitted data
problem is common in this literature, which puts researchers in the uncomfortable position of
estimating demand curves without data on supply or prices! It would be highly problematic here
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as well, but the model structure and the research question at hand provide a convenient work-
around. We sweep out the omitted variables using vectors of importer x commodity and exporter
x commodity intercepts.  This leaves only the trade cost function and the substitution elasticity to
be estimated.
Using intercepts in this manner dramatically reduces the scope for omitted variables and
mis-measurement to plague our estimates, as the intercepts take out all variation that is not
specific to bilateral pairs.  For example, non-tariff barriers that are common to all partners are
swept out.  Similarly, differences across importers in their method of valuing freight charges
(e.g. whether loading expenses are included, whether overland freight is excluded) that are
common to all exporters are also eliminated.  However, some barriers may operate only through
a production effect and not through substitution.  Such effects will be missed entirely by this
estimation. Also, our trade barrier data must exhibit substantial bilateral variation to identify the
substitution elasticity.
The standard approach to measuring trade costs is captured in equation (3).  Total trade
costs are represented as the product of several component costs that are captured by proxy
variables. While convenient for estimation, the multiplicative form has odd economic
implications. Equation (3) implies that the marginal effect of a change in one cost depends on all
other costs.  The estimates in Table 2 suggest that a tariff increase of 10% raises total trade costs
by 10% when countries share both a common language and an adjoining border, but costs rise by
almost 25% if they share neither.  And, whatever costs language capture, they are especially high
for goods with high tariff and freight rates.  The implication for tariffs is clearly wrong, and it is
difficult to think of specific transactions costs captured by language that would depend critically
on the level of tariff and freight rates.23
A more sensible specification combines the components of costs additively.











k= + + + +( ( ) )δ δ δδ0 2 31
In addition to the aforementioned barrier proxies we include ad-valorem freight and tariff
rates. This specification indicates that a tariff increase of 10% increases total trade costs by 10%,
regardless of what other barriers might be operating.  Since the data include explicit relative
                                                       
23 One story does come to mind.  Suppose uncertainty about import product quality is rising in our proxy variables,
and that uncertainty cannot be resolved until products are imported.  Then the cost of resolving the uncertainty is
magnified by the costs (freight, tariffs) of importing the products.
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prices in the form of tariff and freight rates, the coefficient on the trade barrier function can be
interpreted directly as the substitution elasticity, σ.  This depends critically on a result from the
monopolistic competition model that was discussed above – variation in pricing across export
markets is determined entirely by iceberg trade cost factor.  The model then implies that bilateral
variation in explicit trade costs plus exporter fixed effects exactly identifies variation in prices
faced by importers.24  Note also that the coefficients on proxy indicator variables within the trade
barrier function can be interpreted directly in terms of their ad-valorem equivalents.  That is, a
coefficient of -.07 on the language indicator literally indicates that speaking a common language
lowers costs by 7%.  The direct interpretation extends to both the shape (δ1 in (12)) and level (δο
in (12)) of the distance variable.  In contrast, the multiplicative form allows only an assessment
of the shape of barriers, which makes difficult the interpretation of what, precisely, the proxy
captures.25
A careful consideration of functional form points to a different interpretation for standard
proxy variables. Rather than viewing distance, a common language, or adjacency as capturing
trade barriers, it may be more sensible to regard these as preference indicators.
Taking logs of equation (9) we have













k= + + − − − +α σ σ σ1
Preferences interact multiplicatively with barriers.  To implement this we assume that only
freight and tariff rates belong in the ad-valorem trade cost functions, and allow common proxies
to capture the preference parameter






ij= +( ) exp( )1 2 3   or    ln ln( )b b DIST b lang b adjijk k ij k ij k ij= + +1 2 3
The common language proxy lends itself naturally to a preference interpretation, but
motivating the inclusion of observables such as distance and adjacency requires a story about
hysteresis in production patterns.  Suppose trade barriers lead to home or local market effects in
which producers specialize in locally preferred varieties. If scale economies lock in the particular
                                                       
24 If firms price-to-market, the price exclusive of trade costs is also affected by the trade costs and so the freight and
tariff data are insufficient to identify cross-market variation.
25 See the discussion about freight versus telephone costs at the end of Section III.
20
varieties, the home market effect will persist even after the barriers are gone.  This story is
closely related to the endogenous production response described in connection with equation (6),
differing only in the level of aggregation.  We think of variation in sector expenditure and
production (α ik jkn, ) as capturing local market effects that operate at high levels of aggregation
(shifting from automobile production to airplane production).  These are eliminated through the
use of country x commodity intercepts in the estimating equation.  The preference parameters
(bij
k ) capture local market effects at low levels of aggregation (shifting from a very specific kind
of machine tool to another).  These are not eliminated by the intercepts, but may be captured by
the proxies or in the residual.
Since proxies are used to estimate the preference weights the degree of preference is
confounded by the substitution elasticity
(15) $ lnβ σnk k nkb=  for n = 1...3
This is acceptable as the b terms are not by themselves useful and (10) allows us to directly
evaluate the regression coefficients for each component in terms of the price premium they
imply.












KJ= −β σ 1
Using ln( )1 + ≈x x  this gives the increased willing-ness to pay relative to the comparison
country for each component. The comparison country c does not share a common language or
border, and is further than j from the importer.  The coefficients are then interpreted as the
discount the importer must be offered to trade with a partner of greater distance and the premium
the importer will pay to trade with a partner of common language and sharing a border.
The estimating equations are
















kl= + + + + + + + +β δ δ δ εδ0 1 2 3















kl= + + + + + + + +β β β β ε1 2 3
21
An observation is the volume of imports into importer i from exporter j in a 5-digit SITC
“variety” l that belongs to a larger two-digit “good” k.   All observations within a two-digit good
are pooled and estimated together, with each of 62 goods estimated separately. We assume that
all variables super-scripted k in (17) and (18) are identical across varieties l within a good.
Vectors of importer and exporter dummy variables (as opposed to interactions with commodity
effects) are then sufficient to capture all the omitted variables.  This leaves only the substitution
elasticity and the trade cost or preference function to be estimated, and these are specific to each
good.  Below we provide an interpretation for the regression residuals.
Results
We employ 1992 data from the US, New Zealand, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and
Paraguay, with data drawn from the national sources described in section 2 and the appendix.26
Table 4 reports OLS estimates of equation (18) for each sector.  Table 6 averages effects over all
62 goods (treating insignificant estimates as zeros). The coefficient on the freight + tariff
variable is directly interpreted as the CES elasticity (σ βk k= − $ ) for that good.  We find
significant estimates for 57 of the 62 2-digit “goods” with an average value of 5.6 and most
goods in a range from 3 to 8.  The elasticity is useful both as an indicator of the effect of trade
barriers on trade volumes and as a measure of the markup over marginal cost that producers of
differentiated goods can charge.  The average elasticity value implies that a 10% tariff increase
lowers trade by 56 percent and that markups are on the order of 22 percent.  Goods within SITC
7 (Machinery) have the largest elasticities, averaging 8.
Distance, language and adjacency effects are significant for 35, 23, and 16 of the 62
goods, respectively.  The sizes of the proxy variable coefficients are not directly useful, and so
we use equation (15) to interpret them in terms of the price premium they imply.  We also
provide means and standard deviations on the freight + tariff variable for comparison.
Averaging over all goods, the price premia indicate that importers will pay a 4 percent premium
to trade with partners of a common language and a 2 percent premium to trade with adjacent
countries. Importers demand an average premium of 8 percent to buy from partners who are
twice as distant.  Effects differ substantially across goods, with proxies rarely significant in the
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commodity categories (SITC 0-4). In all cases, the price premia from the proxy variables are
comparable in size or smaller than explicitly measured barriers (freight + tariffs).
Table 5 reports non-linear least squares estimates of equation (17). The distance variable
is normalized to mean 1 so that it is comparable in size to the other variables.  The adjacency
variable is dropped as it is insignificant in all estimates.   Out of 56 goods27, significant
substitution elasticities were estimated for 41 goods, with an average value of 9.3.  However,
these estimates are significantly different from OLS estimates in only 12 goods.  Several sectors
had extremely high substitution elasticities, including feedstuffs (58.98) and scientific
instruments (78.6).
Note that predicted signs on proxy variables are the opposite of equation (18) because the
coefficients are directly interpreted as trade costs.  Significant and positive distance effects were
found for only ten of the sectors, with three additional sectors having significant and negative
effects (greater distance lowers costs). To interpret distance coefficients as ad-valorem
equivalents, we calculate the cost of moving the sample mean distance (from 7,000 to 10,000
km, depending on the good) and the additional cost of one standard deviation increase in
distance.  Of the significant estimates, the size of the effect varies widely, from reducing costs by
60 percent, to increasing them fourteen-fold.  These extreme estimates (very large substitution
elasticities and negative distance effects) are highly sensitive to the inclusion of the language
variable.28  Language effects are significantly negative for 23 sectors and indicate that speaking a
common language lowers costs by an average of 5 percent (all sectors, treating insignificant as
zero) to 12 percent (significant estimates only).29
What precisely do these proxies capture?  Comparing the results from (17), where proxies
enter as trade barriers, and (18), where proxies enter as preference parameters, we cautiously
conclude two things.  One, language effects are significant for roughly the same set of goods and
are of similar size (when comparing ad-valorem and price premium equivalents).  This provides
no useful insight into which interpretation is most appropriate.  Two, adjacency effects never
matter and distance effects rarely matter when interpreted directly as trade barriers.  When
interpreted as price premia, distance and adjacency are significant for half and a quarter of the
goods, respectively.  Further, distance premia are large (doubling distance increases the premia
                                                                                                                                                                                  
26 Uruguay is omitted, as data are not available until later years for which we have no matching tariff data.
27 5 goods are omitted from the table as the NLS routine could not converge on a solution.
28 Excluding language yields no negative distance effects.  The substitution elasticity for scientific instruments drops
to 12.4.
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by 20-25) for cork and wood, inorganic chemicals, paper and paperboard, nonmetallic minerals,
iron and steel, rubber manufactures and cork and wood manufactures.   These goods are all
characterized by relatively high transport costs (see Table 1). Since these costs are explicitly in
the regression, the distance coefficient may be identifying an endogenous production response.
Transport costs operate indirectly by placing the production of specific varieties proximate to
locations where these varieties are strongly preferred.30  A similar force may be captured by the
adjacency variable, as adjacency effects are largest for bulky products (furniture, prefabricated
buildings).
Next, we provide robustness checks on the level of aggregation. In estimating (17) and
(18) with two-digit "goods" we assumed that all variables with k superscripts were common to 5-
five-digit varieties within that good.  This may result in two sorts of difficulties.  First, varieties
within each "good" may be so heterogeneous that it is not possible to identify the substitution
elasticity.31  In the extreme case the pooled goods may not be substitutes at all.  This suggests
that, when measured for narrower product categories, estimated substitution elasticities should
rise.
Second, the omitted variables (prices, output and expenditure shares) may exhibit
heterogeneity across varieties within a good and are therefore only partially controlled for by
importer and exporter intercepts. This may simply create noise in the regression, in which case
moving to three- or four-digit “goods” will not change estimate elasticities, but it will shrink
estimated residuals.  Heterogeneity may also manifest itself in the form of the endogenous
production response just discussed in connection with distance and adjacency variables. Since
production responses reinforce and magnify the effects of trade barriers, moving to narrow
product categories should reduce their measured effects as the intercepts do a progressively
better job of controlling for composition. This suggests that, when measured for narrower
product categories, estimated substitution elasticities should fall.  Combined with the effect
described above, changing the level over which goods are pooled has an ambiguous effect on the
estimated CES elasticity.   However, if the intercepts better control for composition at lower
levels we should see smaller estimated volume effects on the proxy variables.
                                                                                                                                                                                  
29 However, distance effects are not meaningful unless both distance coefficients and the CES elasticity are
significant.  Language effects are meaningful if the CES elasticity is significant.
30 It may also be that the freight + tariff variable is noisily measured, or that the model's assumption about transport
cost incidence is inappropriate.  In these cases, distance may capture transport effects directly.
31 In SITC 05, for example, we are literally comparing apples to oranges.
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We re-estimate (18) by pooling all 5-digit “varieties” l within a “good” k, where k is
defined variously as a one-, three-, and four-digit classification. As before we include vectors of
importer and exporter intercepts, but these intercepts now isolate country x "good" specific
information at varying levels of aggregation. To economize on tables, we report in Table 6 three
values for each variable at each level of aggregation.  These include: the number of significant
estimates; the mean estimated coefficient (with mean calculated only over significant
coefficients); and the mean price premium implied by the components in the preference vector
(with the mean calculated over all regressions at that level, and insignificant coefficients are
treated as zeros).  We also report summary information for all goods within SITC codes 5-9
(manufacturing).
The price premia indicate that importers will pay a 3 to 5 percent premium to trade with
partners of a common language and a 1 to 3 percent premium to trade with partners who are
adjacent.  Importers demand a premium of 4 to 11 percent to buy from partners who are twice as
distant.  Regarding the level of pooling, first note that the mean CES elasticity grows larger when
pooling over narrower product categories. Moving from one- to four-digit regressions we find
nearly all the estimated elasticities of trade volume with respect to proxy variables growing
larger.  However, since the CES elasticities are also growing larger, the estimated price premia
do not change much when averaging over all goods.  When averaging over manufactures only,
the premia shrink as we move from two- to four-digit pooling.  This supports the notion that the
proxy variables capture matching of “local” production and consumption and that at
progressively lower levels the country intercepts better capture these composition effects.  Not
all effects are eliminated, suggesting that some preferences operate on very narrow product
specifications that we are unable to measure.
We repeat our non-linear least squares estimates of equation (17), pooling over all
varieties l within a three-digit "good" k (for a total of 248 goods).  The non-linear form and long
lists of intercepts estimated in (17) require substantial variation to identify and further
disaggregation eliminates too many observations to be of much use.  Again, the adjacency
variable is dropped, as it is insignificant in all regressions.  The estimated substitution elasticities
for three-digit goods indicate no clear pattern of difference from two-digit estimates.32
Distance effects are only significant and positive for 10 goods, though very large (traveling the
                                                       
32 The substitution elasticity for three-digit goods is significantly larger than the corresponding two-digit goods in
15% of cases, significantly smaller in 15%, and no different in the rest.
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mean distance roughly doubles goods prices) in each case.  Language effects are significant in 41
goods, and of similar magnitude to two-digit estimates.
Interpreting the Residuals
The R2 reported in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that the models in (17) and (18) explain only a
small part, a third or less, of the variation in trade volumes.  It is not clear, however, what this
poor fit means.  Perhaps the structural model is inappropriate, or perhaps we have omitted
important trade costs that would help fit the bilateral pattern of trade.  An intriguing third
possibility is that the structural model is fine and omitted costs are very small, but that the
elasticity of substitution is very high.  In this case we can account for unexplained trade volumes
with small unmeasured trade barriers.  To evaluate this hypothesis, we provide a structural
interpretation of the regression residuals in terms of the willing-ness to pay for preferred
varieties.33  This allows a partition of trade costs into explicitly measured costs (freight and
tariffs), costs captured by proxies, and unmeasured costs.
Suppose that there are “preferred” varieties, as in equation (9) and that the regression
residuals exactly reflect unobserved preference parameters (ln $b eij
k
ij
k= ).   That is, deviations from
the regression model are ascribed entirely to preferences.  We can rewrite the residual in terms of










k= −exp( $ / ( $ ))ε σ 1
The implied price premium in (19) is small when the residual is small and when the substitution
elasticity is large.
In the regressions associated with Tables 4-6, each observation has its own residual with
its own price premium interpretation.  Some goods are favored (premium greater than one) and
                                                       
33 See Leamer (1988) for a study that employs residuals to measure countries’ “open-ness” to trade.  The structural
context in that study differs considerably from this, employing constant returns models, and ignoring bilateral trade.
34 The residual is from a regression estimated in logs and must be exponentiated to equal the preference term.
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some are disliked (premium less than one) and the mean price premium equals one by
construction.35 We calculate the absolute deviation from one and report its mean and standard
deviation for each two-digit "good" in Tables 4 and 5.  In the interests of space, we provide
calculations using only the point estimate on the substitution elasticity – one could also place
confidence intervals around the premia using the relevant standard errors.
There are several findings.  In cases with above average substitution elasticities ( $σ > 7),
the residual implies an average price premium less than or equal to the freight and tariff rates.
Smaller substitution elasticities imply much larger residual premia.  That is, given the low degree
of substitutability between varieties, an importer must have extremely strong preferences to
generate observed deviations from mean trade volumes.
The pattern of price premia make clear that traditional measures of regression fit are not
especially informative about unmeasured trade barriers. In Table 4, for example, the R2 for SITC
52 (Inorganic Chemicals) and SITC 54 (Pharmaceuticals) are very similar.  However, the
unmeasured price premium is six times larger for SITC 52 because the substitution elasticity is
so much lower. Similarly, there is no difference in regression fit for the different levels of
aggregation examined in Table 6, but the implied price premium shrinks as the substitution
elasticity grows.
Of course, several cautions should be offered.  First, interpreting the residuals as
unmeasured barriers or preferences admits that the estimation suffers from omitted variables,
along with the attendant biases they induce.  These are especially problematic if they affect the
estimated substitution elasticity.
Second, the residuals may be sensitive to measurement error.  This seems like a fairly
minor concern, as tariff rates are taken from customs schedules, and the import volumes and
freight rates come from carefully collected customs information data.  National customs offices
have strong incentives (the desire to levy duties) to verify that these data are correct, and the
wherewithal to physical detain and inspect shipments for reporting accuracy.  One suspects this
leads to greater accuracy here than is obtainable with any other industrial statistic.  Clearly the
proxies are subject to error, but that is largely the point.  We do not know what precisely they
capture and we want to partition costs into the measured, the proxied for, and the unmeasured.
Third, the underlying structural model may not properly characterize import demands, or
may only fit the data for certain goods.  However, this interpretation makes the price premium
                                                       
35 That is, the least squares routine generates a log normal error with mean zero, corresponding to an unobserved
preference weight of one.
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equivalents very useful as a kind of test of model fit.  One can look at residuals that imply
unmeasured trade barriers equal to or smaller than freight and tariff rates and believe such
barriers plausibly exist.  When residuals imply barriers that are orders of magnitude larger it
becomes clear that the model at hand simply isn’t right.
Where might the model go wrong?  There are several possibilities. First, the aggregation
argument offered above cites problems with omitted variables and comparing heterogeneous
goods when pooling over a broad set of goods. Table 6 suggests that narrowing the definition of
a "good" raises the substitution elasticity, and shrinks the price premia implied by the residual.
Related to this, we may simply not have enough variation to identify the relevant elasticities.
This is especially problematic in non-linear least squares estimates of equation (17) for goods
with small numbers of observations.
Second, our assumptions on the incidence of transport costs on goods pricing are critical.
If firms lower export prices when trade costs are high, variation in freight and tariff rates will
overstate actual variation in prices faced by importers.  This results in low estimated elasticities,
and large price premia implied by the residuals.
Three, the model emphasizes smooth substitution and ignores selection effects. SITC 05
(Fruits and Vegetables) in Table 4 and SITC 02 (Fish) in Table 5 have low substitution
elasticities and imply unobserved barriers that swamp freight and tariff rates.  Yet, freight rates
on these goods are exceptionally high and vary considerably over trading partners.  The answer
may be that in these goods freight rates work mostly on the extensive margin – importers buy
from proximate sources of supply or not at all.
Conclusion
Trade barriers play a central role in models of international specialization and trade, and
empirical evaluation of these models must ultimately confront trade costs. This paper offers
direct and indirect evidence on trade barriers, moving us toward a comprehensive geography of
trade costs.  There are three main contributions.
One, we provide new data on freight rates for a number of importers.  Rates vary
substantially over exporters, and aggregate expenditures on freight are at the low end of the
observed range.  This suggests import choices are made so as to minimize transportation costs.
Two, we estimate the technological relationship between freight rates and distance and use this
to interpret the trade barriers equivalents of common proxy variables from the literature.  The
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resulting calculations reveal implausibly large barriers.  Three, we use a multi-sector model of
trade to isolate channels through which trade barriers affect trade volumes.  The model motivates
an estimation technique that delivers direct estimates of substitution elasticities.  This allows a
complete characterization of the trade costs implied by trade flows and a partition of those costs
into three components: explicitly measured costs (tariffs and freight), costs associated with
common proxy variables, and costs that are implied but unmeasured.  Explicitly measured costs
are, for many goods, most of the story.
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Table 1 -- Commodity Distribution of Freight Rates
(Freight as % of Imports, Aggregated over all Partners, 1994)
SITC USA Argentina Brazil Chile Paraguay Uruguay N Zealand USA Argentina Brazil Chile Paraguay Uruguay N Zealand
All goods 3.8 7.5 7.3 8.8 13.3 4.6 8.3
0 Food and Live Animals 8.2 9.9 10.4 12.7 12.0 3.6 14.5 14.1 21.6 23.1 21.9 12.8 7.4 15.4
00 Live Animals 2.4 20.7 5.8 16.9 13.1 13.4 4.3 21.1 37.7 40.5 42.1 10.9 18.2 21.8
01 Meat And Meat Products 6.7 6.7 5.4 6.8 12.9 2.6 8.8 9.7 13.6 17.8 21.9 12.4 5.3 15.7
02 Dairy Products 6.3 8.4 5.2 11.6 12.9 7.1 8.8 9.9 16.8 15.7 17.8 12.0 7.1 12.6
03 Fish 5.2 7.0 7.0 6.3 10.7 5.3 6.4 13.2 23.6 20.3 24.6 13.0 8.3 14.0
04 Cereals 8.3 12.6 12.8 14.2 11.2 5.7 22.1 14.0 23.3 27.9 27.9 13.4 9.1 20.0
05 Vegetables And Fruits 15.6 15.3 11.1 23.4 11.4 4.3 25.7 17.4 23.7 24.7 21.7 12.6 7.0 16.9
06 Sugars, Sugar Prep 9.8 12.0 6.8 12.3 10.4 3.5 9.3 12.7 20.6 21.7 18.6 13.1 8.7 14.1
07 Coffee, Tea 5.0 5.9 10.3 10.2 10.0 1.3 7.3 10.8 18.0 19.8 20.2 12.5 5.2 12.1
08 Feeding Stuff 8.0 13.3 6.8 16.4 10.6 3.8 17.4 16.3 16.7 24.7 17.2 13.5 7.5 16.3
09 Misc food products 6.1 9.6 6.2 9.1 11.6 2.4 8.2 11.5 22.4 22.6 20.5 13.5 8.8 14.8
1 Beverages & Tobacco 6.9 11.3 9.0 8.4 10.4 4.8 9.4 14.4 20.6 18.3 18.2 12.8 8.0 14.0
11 Beverages 7.2 12.0 10.4 8.8 9.4 4.5 9.9 14.3 21.2 18.3 18.0 12.5 7.7 14.4
12 Tobacco 5.3 4.9 5.3 5.7 11.7 5.6 6.4 14.6 18.2 18.8 19.7 13.9 9.0 12.5
2 Crude Materials 8.2 15.2 7.7 12.0 10.2 3.7 16.3 15.1 20.5 20.1 23.1 12.0 8.3 20.6
21 Hides, Skins 1.5 10.9 7.9 6.7 12.9 2.3 5.7 9.3 10.4 13.8 8.4 12.5 3.1 11.6
22 Oil Seeds 5.2 8.9 7.5 10.8 13.2 5.2 15.0 15.6 27.4 13.0 22.8 12.6 3.9 16.6
23 Crude Rubber 8.1 10.8 8.8 13.5 12.1 2.9 12.3 13.7 12.9 17.6 17.0 12.0 3.3 16.3
24 Cork And Wood 5.8 6.6 2.8 18.5 12.3 2.2 13.0 16.0 15.2 22.7 24.5 10.4 8.1 19.8
25 Pulp And Waste 6.0 15.2 11.8 24.0 8.8 3.9 20.9 15.5 25.5 19.4 33.3 10.6 7.1 24.7
26 Textile Fibers 5.8 8.2 5.1 10.0 11.2 1.7 10.1 15.8 23.5 20.7 19.6 13.7 7.6 16.1
27 Crude Fertilize 27.0 34.4 21.1 38.6 9.3 17.0 63.5 21.1 26.1 31.3 33.3 11.3 13.1 33.4
28 Metalliferous Ores 8.9 21.9 6.1 6.3 8.8 27.4 7.2 12.6 22.1 13.5 36.0 10.1 17.7 22.5
29 Crude Animal n.e.s 10.9 10.1 6.6 7.6 12.3 4.5 7.7 12.9 17.5 16.1 17.1 12.3 7.9 15.3
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants 6.6 14.7 10.7 11.8 20.9 4.7 9.9 15.7 20.5 20.3 24.9 13.8 9.2 18.7
32 Coal, Coke 15.7 34.5 15.7 29.7 9.3 2.2 55.7 28.6 44.9 19.8 47.3 8.6 5.1 49.3
33 Petroleum, 6.9 15.6 8.9 9.4 21.5 3.8 9.8 12.6 18.5 16.9 21.2 13.9 9.3 16.9
34 Gas, Natural 3.5 0.5 26.1 28.9 13.1 19.4 11.4 23.6 11.2 28.7 24.4 14.3 11.0 13.3
4 Animal & Veg Oils, Fats 7.1 10.8 5.4 9.3 12.5 2.6 10.6 10.6 17.4 17.6 16.6 11.7 5.0 12.0
41 Animal Oils 6.7 15.4 10.7 17.8 11.6 5.3 13.0 10.8 18.6 17.3 17.7 10.7 4.5 14.2
42  Vegetable Fats 7.0 9.8 4.6 8.5 12.8 2.4 10.4 9.5 16.1 15.0 13.6 12.5 4.8 11.2
43 Animal Or Veget fats 8.3 10.1 12.2 13.4 11.4 2.3 10.7 12.7 18.6 21.6 19.4 10.7 5.6 12.8
5 Chemicals & Related Prod 4.5 7.6 6.8 10.2 10.4 3.0 9.0 9.0 12.3 14.0 14.4 12.4 4.7 13.0
51 Organic Chemical 4.2 6.4 5.1 9.3 11.4 3.2 7.5 6.6 10.1 11.5 12.5 12.0 3.1 11.6
52 Inorganic Chemicals 7.1 18.9 13.8 21.5 11.4 5.2 19.8 12.2 16.4 18.4 19.8 11.8 4.5 17.8
53 Dyeing, Tanning 3.4 7.1 5.9 5.5 9.7 2.0 7.1 6.8 11.9 12.0 13.2 12.7 4.7 11.2
54 Pharmaceuticals 1.2 3.2 2.0 4.6 10.9 1.3 2.8 3.9 6.8 8.2 7.9 12.5 2.9 7.7
55 Essential Oils 3.4 8.5 8.8 8.5 11.0 3.6 8.0 8.9 13.6 18.9 17.1 13.0 6.7 12.4
56 Fertilizers 14.3 17.1 13.4 18.1 8.5 2.6 22.4 15.4 18.4 14.5 23.4 10.1 4.8 27.3
Average Freight Rate (Trade-Weighted) Average Freight Rate (Unweighted)
Table 1 -- Commodity Distribution of Freight Rates
(Freight as % of Imports, Aggregated over all Partners, 1994)
SITC USA Argentina Brazil Chile Paraguay Uruguay N Zealand USA Argentina Brazil Chile Paraguay Uruguay N Zealand
Average Freight Rate (Trade-Weighted) Average Freight Rate (Unweighted)
57 Plastics In Primary 5.0 9.5 8.1 11.2 9.6 4.0 12.0 13.6 13.3 14.2 13.9 12.4 4.8 13.0
58 Plastics In Nonprimary 4.6 8.3 7.9 9.4 11.0 3.8 8.4 10.8 13.6 16.8 16.0 13.4 7.1 12.4
59 Chemical Materials nes 4.6 7.1 7.4 7.5 10.2 2.8 7.9 8.8 14.2 16.0 14.4 12.2 6.0 13.7
6 Manuf. Goods (by material) 5.3 9.4 8.5 10.9 11.2 4.7 10.0 10.3 15.5 17.7 14.7 13.3 7.9 13.1
61 Leather manufactures 3.8 6.2 2.1 4.3 11.0 0.9 4.3 8.2 17.1 9.5 12.4 12.8 5.2 10.6
62 Rubber Manufactures 5.3 7.6 7.7 10.8 10.2 3.6 10.8 10.9 13.6 16.8 15.3 13.3 6.9 12.9
63 Cork And Wood Manufactures 6.9 8.3 8.7 11.6 10.2 4.2 12.2 13.5 23.0 27.2 23.1 12.2 10.2 18.2
64 Paper, Paperboard 6.0 13.1 15.5 14.2 9.6 5.4 13.8 12.4 18.8 23.0 18.0 12.6 8.9 16.4
65 Textile Yarn 4.9 8.0 7.0 8.3 13.3 3.9 7.5 11.1 15.9 18.3 14.2 13.6 7.6 11.7
66 Nonmetallic Manufactures 4.8 13.0 12.5 19.7 10.7 6.0 15.6 12.2 19.2 21.9 18.6 13.3 10.7 17.2
67 Iron And Steel 8.4 8.1 10.1 11.5 11.2 6.7 12.8 9.8 13.3 14.7 12.8 11.5 6.9 13.7
68 Nonferrous Metals 2.2 4.3 4.2 6.2 9.5 2.9 5.2 5.8 11.5 12.6 12.3 12.2 5.1 8.9
69 Manufactures Of metals nes 4.8 10.0 9.6 9.0 12.0 5.1 7.4 7.9 13.5 16.0 12.9 13.8 7.4 11.4
7 Machinery & Transp Equip 2.0 5.6 5.1 6.3 13.8 4.1 6.3 5.7 11.2 11.5 11.3 13.5 7.3 9.6
71 Power Generating Machinery 1.7 4.4 4.1 4.0 12.4 3.5 3.7 5.6 11.0 10.7 11.3 12.5 7.9 10.0
72 Machinery Specialized 2.9 5.8 4.7 5.9 12.0 3.8 5.9 6.3 11.3 10.5 11.3 13.0 6.8 10.1
73 Metalworking Machinery 3.1 5.4 4.4 5.0 12.0 3.2 5.0 5.2 9.5 8.7 11.6 13.8 5.9 8.4
74 General Industrial Machinery 3.0 6.6 6.1 6.6 13.2 4.2 6.2 6.5 11.6 12.0 10.7 13.4 6.7 10.5
75 Office Machines 1.7 4.9 4.8 4.7 15.5 4.5 2.7 3.5 10.0 10.4 9.4 13.7 7.5 5.9
76 Telecommunications 1.9 4.8 6.6 5.0 15.6 3.3 3.5 4.1 10.4 10.8 11.2 14.0 6.8 7.6
77 Electrical Machinery 1.8 7.0 5.6 7.2 12.6 4.5 5.3 4.9 10.7 11.9 11.0 13.7 7.0 8.9
78 Road Vehicles 2.1 5.7 4.8 8.1 13.0 4.2 10.5 8.3 13.5 15.9 15.2 14.0 11.1 14.8
79 Transport Equip 0.9 2.8 1.6 4.9 14.3 5.6 3.3 6.0 12.3 10.8 13.0 12.3 7.5 10.1
8 Misc Manufactures. 4.7 9.3 8.1 9.1 15.2 5.8 6.6 8.3 16.9 18.7 15.3 13.9 9.0 12.1
81 Prefabricated Buildings 7.0 11.7 16.7 11.5 14.2 5.1 9.9 10.0 18.0 22.5 18.8 14.1 8.6 13.9
82 Furniture 6.7 12.5 15.3 17.7 13.7 8.1 15.0 12.7 22.6 32.0 26.8 13.5 14.9 20.3
83 Travel Goods 6.9 14.8 20.1 11.9 18.0 9.6 8.9 12.9 23.0 25.5 16.5 14.2 13.0 13.3
84 Apparel 5.2 9.2 11.9 9.2 13.8 5.2 5.7 8.6 18.4 20.7 14.7 14.0 8.2 12.4
85 Footwear 4.9 7.6 7.9 8.6 16.0 4.5 6.8 10.6 15.2 20.1 14.0 13.9 8.3 11.1
87 Scientific Instruments 2.0 5.1 3.8 4.9 11.8 3.0 3.9 4.4 10.1 8.6 9.9 13.1 6.3 7.7
88 Photographic Equipment 2.5 5.5 6.0 5.3 15.6 3.7 4.3 4.9 12.5 13.0 10.6 13.8 7.6 9.7
89 Miscellaneous Manufactures 4.7 12.1 12.8 12.0 15.6 7.5 7.4 8.7 18.5 21.6 17.9 14.3 10.1 13.0
9 All other goods, NES 1.0 4.5 0.8 7.6 6.8 2.5 0.6 2.5 18.3 7.0 11.8 7.7 2.5 7.6
71 69 72 66 47 64 66
Notes
1.  Commodity rates describe the importer's total freight expenditure relative to total imports for that commodity
2.  Final columns describe the distribution over exporters (to US and to NZ) of freight rates for that commodity. 
Sources:  US Census, Statistics New Zealand, ALADI Secretariat.  See appendix for details.
Weighted < unweighted rate: count
Table 2:  Barrier Effects on Trade Volumes and Ad-valorem Equivalents
Gravity McCallum Helliwell McCallum Helliwell
Distance -1.01 -1.42 -0.92 elasticity of costs 0.22 0.46 0.27 0.39 0.22 0.46
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) w.r.t. distance
implied sigma 4.59 2.20 5.26 3.64 4.18 2.00
Language 0.66 0.58 115 135 115 134
(0.06) (0.12)
Adjacency 0.76 0.15 118 141 104 108
(0.15) (0.15)
Border .. 3.09 2.09 180 234 165 284
(0.13) (0.29)
EC 0.26 106 114
(0.1)
obs 8610 683 465
R2 0.65 0.81 0.89
Volume Effects are estimated, Ad-valorem equivalents are constructed
1.  Elasticity of costs w.r.t. distance taken from freight regressions in table 3
2.  Sigma = B1/d1
3.  Ad - valorem equivalents = 100* exp(Bi/sigma)
Gravity dep var: aggregate bilateral imports for 125 importers and exporters (no domestic consumption) from StatCan database
McCallum dep var:  aggregate bilateral imports between Canadian provinces and US states (Table 1, Column 2)
Helliwell dep var:  aggregate bilateral imports between OECD countries, including implied value of domestic consumption (Table 2, Column 3)
All regressions include partner country/state GDP terms in regression
Barrier Estimates:  Volume Effects
Gravity
Barrier Estimates:  Ad-valorem Equivalents
Table 3:  Spatial Structure of Freight Rates
(Regression Evidence from 7 Importers, 1994)
Pooled Regression:  All importers
weight- Distance to Adj
const value (kg/$) exporter (km) R2 obs km 2500 5000 10000 15000
0.246 0.267 0.283 278869
Intercepts (0.001) (0.002) mean kg/$
US -4.62 0.62 7.1 8.5 10.2 11.4
Argentina -4.17 0.44 10.2 12.3 14.8 16.4
Brazil -4.23 1.44 12.8 15.4 18.6 20.7
Chile -4.19 0.41 9.8 11.8 14.2 15.8
Paraguay -3.99 1.71 17.0 20.5 24.6 27.4
Uruguay -4.66 0.38 6.0 7.2 8.7 9.7
New Zealand -4.25 0.23 7.9 9.6 11.5 12.8
Notes:
1.  All variables in logs.  Standard Errors in parentheses
2.  Observations consist of all data, exporter x commodity (at most disaggregated level available)
US Data:  Imports by Mode
weight- Distance to Adj
const value (kg/$) exporter (km) R2 obs km 2500 5000 10000 15000
US Imports (Census)
mean kg/$
AIR -4.66 0.572 0.459 0.45 534088 0.06 6.9 9.4 13.0 15.6
(.030) (.0008) (.003)
OCEAN -4.17 0.473 0.220 0.38 541333 0.45 5.9 6.9 8.0 8.8
(.019) (.0008) (.002)
km 300 750 1500 3000
US Imports from Canada (Transborder Surface Freight Data)
mean kg/$
TRUCK -5.60 0.235 0.275 0.19 33183 1.53 1.8 2.3 2.7 3.3
(.040) (.003) (.006)
RAIL -6.46 0.574 0.388 0.31 11965 3.61 1.4 2.0 2.7 3.5
(.069) (.009) (.010)
Predicted freight rate -- % of import value
(for cargo of modal mean kg/$)
(for cargo of country mean kg/$)
Predicted freight rate -- % of import value
Table 4:  OLS Estimates of Import Demand
CES DIST LANG ADJ R2 OBS Mean s.d. DIST LANG ADJ Mean s.d.
00 Live Animals -3.25* -0.59 -0.04 -0.11 0.24 196 0.28 0.30 0.39 0.42
(1.05) (0.43) (0.66) (0.77)
01 Meat And Meat Products -8.00* -0.55 0.05 -1.47 0.37 464 0.20 0.18 0.23 0.21
(1.26) (0.3) (0.62) (0.76)
02 Dairy Products -7.01* -0.34 -0.94 -0.96 0.30 499 0.25 0.20 0.24 0.20
(1.01) (0.34) (0.51) (0.76)
03 Fish -4.76* 0.37* 0.6* 0.68 0.31 1829 0.19 0.19 0.08 0.13 0.37 0.33
(0.48) (0.18) (0.27) (0.45)
04 Cereals -5.45* -0.53* -0.21 -0.36 0.28 1028 0.27 0.23 -0.10 0.35 0.30
(0.73) (0.24) (0.37) (0.52)
05 Vegetables And Fruits -2.46* -0.04 0.06 0.17 0.26 3413 0.25 0.21 0.71 0.83
(0.34) (0.14) (0.18) (0.29)
06 Sugars, Sugar Prep -2.42* -0.53 0.18 -1.08 0.28 728 0.24 0.18 0.71 0.75
(0.99) (0.3) (0.41) (0.69)
07 Coffee, Tea -4.6* 0.01 0.55* -0.49 0.27 1764 0.20 0.19 0.12 0.39 0.35
(0.58) (0.18) (0.26) (0.42)
08 Feeding Stuff -3.61* 0.07 0.40 1.37 0.20 261 0.24 0.22 0.47 0.46
(1.3) (0.46) (0.69) (1.03)
09 Misc food products -4.86* -0.24 0.69* 0.19 0.28 998 0.27 0.23 0.14 0.36 0.29
(0.69) (0.24) (0.31) (0.54)
11 Beverages -1.48 -0.45 0.44 0.21 0.24 808 0.27 0.17
(0.91) (0.26) (0.3) (0.54)
12 Tobacco -6.62* -0.62 -0.61 -0.70 0.29 192 0.27 0.30 0.28 0.20
(1.34) (0.82) (0.98) (1.52)
21 Hides, Skins -5.96* -0.23 0.54 -1.62 0.24 257 0.11 0.12 0.23 0.19
(1.94) (0.39) (0.59) (0.84)
Volume Effects ResidualFreight + Tariffs
Implied Price Premium
Table 4:  OLS Estimates of Import Demand
CES DIST LANG ADJ R2 OBS Mean s.d. DIST LANG ADJ Mean s.d.
Volume Effects ResidualFreight + Tariffs
22 Oil Seeds -3.83* 0.14 1.77* 0.18 0.38 231 0.22 0.24 0.46 0.40 0.36
(1.17) (0.43) (0.64) (1.04)
23 Crude Rubber -6.27* -0.22 -0.42 -0.02 0.27 558 0.20 0.17 0.25 0.19
(0.99) (0.32) (0.44) (0.74)
24 Cork And Wood -3.29* -1.00* 0.47 -0.80 0.25 448 0.21 0.18 -0.31 0.48 0.47
(1.11) (0.35) (0.5) (0.88)
25 Pulp And Waste -4.43* -0.08 0.45 0.86 0.40 151 0.29 0.30 0.36 0.30
(1.37) (1.06) (0.94) (1.97)
26 Textile Fibers -5.12* 0.24 0.62 0.75 0.14 977 0.24 0.23 0.34 0.29
(0.66) (0.25) (0.32) (0.49)
27 Crude Fertilize 1.64* -0.30 -0.39 -0.45 0.25 1393 0.30 0.27 1410 22931
(0.39) (0.21) (0.26) (0.48)
28 Metalliferous Ores -1.10 -0.44 -0.28 1.04 0.29 742 0.17 0.20
(0.8) (0.3) (0.42) (0.64)
29 Crude Animal n.e.s -4.07* 0.03 -0.05 0.13 0.23 1989 0.19 0.20 0.38 0.32
(0.39) (0.15) (0.19) (0.37)
32 Coal, Coke -4.4* 0.29 0.11 -1.64 0.45 77 0.37 0.32 0.33 0.33
(1.94) (0.76) (1.1) (1.62)
33 Petroleum, -5.61* -1.07* 0.76 -0.80 0.33 496 0.23 0.19 -0.19 0.41 0.36
(1.24) (0.44) (0.56) (0.87)
34 Gas, Natural 3.58 -0.65 0.44 0.92 0.54 124 0.23 0.17
(2.49) (0.83) (1.46) (1.66)
41 Animal Oils -1.74 -0.71 -1.26 1.19 0.18 127 0.18 0.10
(3.11) (0.48) (0.88) (1.35)
42  Vegetable Fats -6.59* -0.20 -0.21 -0.18 0.41 481 0.18 0.17 0.24 0.20
(1.18) (0.31) (0.45) (0.68)
Table 4:  OLS Estimates of Import Demand
CES DIST LANG ADJ R2 OBS Mean s.d. DIST LANG ADJ Mean s.d.
Volume Effects ResidualFreight + Tariffs
43 Animal Or Veget fats -3.83* -0.44 -0.15 0.03 0.35 252 0.22 0.15 0.35 0.28
(1.4) (0.39) (0.57) (0.83)
51 Organic Chemical -7.5* -0.86* -0.03 -1.23* 0.27 7037 0.17 0.13 -0.11 -0.16 0.22 0.17
(0.33) (0.1) (0.11) (0.22)
52 Inorganic Chemicals -1.41* -0.76* -0.09 -0.74* 0.23 3705 0.21 0.18 -0.54 -0.52 1.08 1.62
(0.35) (0.13) (0.16) (0.28)
53 Dyeing, Tanning -6.37* -0.33* 0.31 0.05 0.32 2524 0.20 0.16 -0.05 0.24 0.18
(0.46) (0.13) (0.17) (0.27)
54 Pharmaceuticals -9.53* -0.36* 0.57* -0.23 0.22 2704 0.14 0.12 -0.04 0.06 0.18 0.14
(0.58) (0.15) (0.17) (0.33)
55 Essential Oils -5.5* -0.69* 0.53* 0.12 0.35 2344 0.24 0.21 -0.12 0.10 0.30 0.25
(0.43) (0.14) (0.18) (0.32)
56 Fertilizers -1.34 -0.67 -0.64 -1.50 0.17 453 0.23 0.19
(1.16) (0.4) (0.54) (0.85)
57 Plastics In Primary -6.06* -0.76* 0.28 -0.43 0.32 2775 0.21 0.17 -0.13 0.24 0.19
(0.4) (0.13) (0.16) (0.26)
58 Plastics In Nonprimary -5.54* -0.82* 0.95* 0.61 0.38 2171 0.23 0.16 -0.15 0.17 0.28 0.21
(0.53) (0.15) (0.19) (0.34)
59 Chemical Materials nes -6.75* -0.3* 0.34* -0.11 0.26 3362 0.22 0.18 -0.04 0.05 0.25 0.19
(0.38) (0.13) (0.16) (0.27)
61 Leather manufactures -8.92* -0.20 0.12 -0.04 0.36 1001 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.14
(0.75) (0.21) (0.28) (0.49)
62 Rubber Manufactures -3.57* -0.77* 0.36* 1.07* 0.33 2891 0.24 0.18 -0.22 0.10 0.30 0.46 0.44
(0.44) (0.14) (0.18) (0.31)
63 Cork And Wood Manufactures -3.99* -0.79* -0.03 0.37 0.40 1741 0.25 0.22 -0.20 0.39 0.34
(0.48) (0.17) (0.22) (0.41)
Table 4:  OLS Estimates of Import Demand
CES DIST LANG ADJ R2 OBS Mean s.d. DIST LANG ADJ Mean s.d.
Volume Effects ResidualFreight + Tariffs
64 Paper, Paperboard -4.25* -1.05* 0.25 0.29 0.30 4544 0.27 0.22 -0.25 0.42 0.38
(0.33) (0.12) (0.15) (0.27)
65 Textile Yarn -7.82* -0.3* 0.24* -0.13 0.27 14384 0.25 0.19 -0.04 0.03 0.22 0.18
(0.18) (0.06) (0.08) (0.14)
66 Nonmetallic Manufactures -2.65* -0.59* 0.29* 0.52* 0.31 6524 0.26 0.21 -0.22 0.11 0.20 0.61 0.67
(0.24) (0.09) (0.12) (0.2)
67 Iron And Steel -3.53* -0.86* 0.21 -0.40 0.29 6024 0.20 0.14 -0.24 0.44 0.38
(0.34) (0.1) (0.12) (0.22)
68 Nonferrous Metals -6.66* -0.64* 0.31 -0.79* 0.26 2839 0.14 0.15 -0.10 -0.12 0.29 0.23
(0.54) (0.15) (0.19) (0.33)
69 Manufactures Of metals nes -4.85* -0.63* 0.49* 0.65* 0.36 10889 0.22 0.17 -0.13 0.10 0.13 0.35 0.29
(0.24) (0.07) (0.09) (0.17)
71 Power Generating Machinery -7.87* -0.5* 0.99* 0.26 0.38 2937 0.19 0.16 -0.06 0.13 0.22 0.17
(0.49) (0.15) (0.17) (0.34)
72 Machinery Specialized -8.52* -0.58* 0.32* -0.31 0.35 7444 0.19 0.15 -0.07 0.04 0.18 0.14
(0.29) (0.08) (0.1) (0.19)
73 Metalworking Machinery -8.09* -0.8* 0.55* -0.61* 0.44 3771 0.19 0.15 -0.10 0.07 -0.08 0.16 0.13
(0.37) (0.11) (0.13) (0.25)
74 General Industrial Machinery -6.98* -0.67* 0.7* 0.45* 0.41 13375 0.20 0.15 -0.10 0.10 0.06 0.23 0.18
(0.22) (0.06) (0.07) (0.14)
75 Office Machines -11.02* -0.21 0.66* -0.32 0.38 2472 0.18 0.17 0.06 0.17 0.13
(0.66) (0.17) (0.19) (0.39)
76 Telecommunications -9.44* -0.35* 0.29 1.11* 0.46 3812 0.22 0.18 -0.04 0.12 0.19 0.15
(0.42) (0.13) (0.15) (0.31)
77 Electrical Machinery -5.88* -0.66* 0.76* 1.09* 0.40 13750 0.20 0.16 -0.11 0.13 0.19 0.30 0.25
(0.24) (0.07) (0.08) (0.17)
Table 4:  OLS Estimates of Import Demand
CES DIST LANG ADJ R2 OBS Mean s.d. DIST LANG ADJ Mean s.d.
Volume Effects ResidualFreight + Tariffs
78 Road Vehicles -7.11* -0.4* 0.68* 0.73* 0.30 2674 0.26 0.20 -0.06 0.10 0.10 0.28 0.25
(0.48) (0.16) (0.19) (0.35)
79 Transport Equip -7.4* -0.20 0.38 0.39 0.31 947 0.16 0.20 0.25 0.21
(0.73) (0.24) (0.36) (0.63)
81 Prefabricated Buildings -4.4* -0.6* -0.08 1.2* 0.43 1433 0.27 0.21 -0.14 0.27 0.35 0.29
(0.56) (0.19) (0.22) (0.47)
82 Furniture -3.64* -0.64* 0.30 1.22* 0.52 2250 0.32 0.27 -0.18 0.33 0.39 0.34
(0.39) (0.15) (0.18) (0.35)
83 Travel Goods -5.05* -0.53* 0.10 0.69 0.56 1296 0.33 0.24 -0.11 0.26 0.21
(0.53) (0.17) (0.21) (0.4)
84 Apparel -5.61* -0.46* 0.42* 1.04* 0.46 11219 0.31 0.21 -0.08 0.07 0.19 0.30 0.25
(0.22) (0.07) (0.09) (0.16)
85 Footwear -7.22* -0.43* -0.01 0.09 0.39 1486 0.31 0.19 -0.06 0.24 0.19
(0.59) (0.18) (0.24) (0.44)
87 Scientific Instruments -6.72* -0.63* 0.59* 0.63* 0.43 6405 0.18 0.14 -0.09 0.09 0.09 0.23 0.18
(0.36) (0.09) (0.11) (0.21)
88 Photographic Equipment -8.13* -0.25* 0.4* 0.04 0.33 4131 0.20 0.17 -0.03 0.05 0.22 0.19
(0.43) (0.12) (0.15) (0.29)
89 Miscellaneous Manufactures -4.88* -0.42* 0.59* 0.53* 0.37 14386 0.25 0.22 -0.09 0.12 0.11 0.36 0.31
(0.18) (0.06) (0.08) (0.15)
Table 5:  Non-linear Least Squares Estimates of Import Demand
CES DIST - d0 DIST - d1 LANG R2 OBS Dist (mean) Dist(sd) LANG Mean s.d.
00 Live Animals -4.53 0.58 0.37 -0.08 0.24 196
(3.79) (1.74) (1.15) (0.24)
01 Meat And Meat Products -3.10 -0.81* -0.02 0.00 0.37 464
(1.62) (0.23) (0.04) (0.07)
02 Dairy Products -4.53 -0.52 -0.04 0.16 0.30 499
(3.44) (0.69) (0.11) (0.1)
03 Fish -1.19* -0.94* 0.00 -0.04 0.32 1829 1.35 2.15
(0.22) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
04 Cereals -5.03* -0.15 -0.28 0.07 0.28 1028 0.38 0.33
(2.03) (0.45) (0.59) (0.08)
06 Sugars, Sugar Prep -2.41* 0.08 3.39 -0.10 0.28 728 0.71 0.76
(1.01) (0.15) (2.46) (0.21)
08 Feeding Stuff -58.98* 20.15* 0.01 -0.11 0.20 261 0.03 0.02
(4.66) (5.21) (0.01) (0.25)
09 Misc food products -5.74 0.30 0.28 -0.18* 0.28 998 -0.18
(3.18) (0.96) (0.97) (0.08)
12 Tobacco -7.56* 0.14 0.72 0.18 0.30 192 0.25 0.17
(2.31) (0.5) (2.46) (0.21)
21 Hides, Skins -3.46 -0.43 0.02 -0.10 0.23 257
(6.06) (1.29) (0.13) (0.11)
22 Oil Seeds -3.57* 0.01 2.82 -0.42* 0.38 231 -0.42 0.42 0.39
(1.19) (0.11) (14.34) (0.17)
23 Crude Rubber -38.23 7.27 0.01 0.09 0.27 558
(206.58) (47.51) (0.05) (0.1)
24 Cork And Wood -5.27 0.99 0.35 -0.16 0.25 448
(5.43) (2.32) (0.85) (0.2)
25 Pulp And Waste -5.22 0.25 0.45 -0.21 0.40 151
(5.11) (1.64) (3.33) (0.23)
Volume Effects Ad-valorem equivalent Residual (price premium)
Table 5:  Non-linear Least Squares Estimates of Import Demand
CES DIST - d0 DIST - d1 LANG R2 OBS Dist (mean) Dist(sd) LANG Mean s.d.
Volume Effects Ad-valorem equivalent Residual (price premium)
26 Textile Fibers -5.17* 0.03 1.44 -0.13 0.14 977 0.34 0.29
(0.72) (0.11) (3.06) (0.07)
27 Crude Fertilize 1.43* -0.09 1.67 -0.29 0.25 1393 9.E+05 2.E+07
(0.44) (0.21) (2.51) (0.16)
28 Metalliferous Ores -0.8* -0.66* -0.09* -0.16 0.28 742 -0.66 -0.69 2.35 5.78
(0.36) (0.21) (0.04) (0.18)
29 Crude Animal n.e.s -4.06* 0.00 -1.12 0.02 0.23 1989 0.38 0.32
(0.41) (0.02) (2.08) (0.06)
33 Petroleum, -5.75* 0.08 2.37 -0.22* 0.34 496 -0.22 0.40 0.35
(1.28) (0.12) (1.54) (0.11)
34 Gas, Natural 1.71 -0.75 0.20 0.23 0.54 124
(2.02) (0.51) (0.41) (0.49)
41 Animal Oils -4.06 1.10 0.82 0.52 0.19 127
(3.69) (2.15) (0.94) (0.92)
42  Vegetable Fats -8.20 0.35 0.11 0.05 0.41 481
(10.79) (2.34) (0.74) (0.09)
43 Animal Or Veget fats -4.86* 0.35 0.61 0.05 0.36 252 0.28 0.22
(2.04) (0.63) (1.15) (0.18)
51 Organic Chemical -8.08* 0.1* 1.35* 0.00 0.27 7037 0.10 0.04 0.21 0.16
(0.35) (0.03) (0.32) (0.02)
52 Inorganic Chemicals -2.03* 0.53* 1.41* 0.03 0.23 3705 0.53 0.21 0.77 0.95
(0.4) (0.25) (0.43) (0.12)
53 Dyeing, Tanning -7.35* 0.22 0.41 -0.05 0.33 2524 0.21 0.16
(0.94) (0.19) (0.39) (0.03)
54 Pharmaceuticals -10.09* 0.09 0.59 -0.06* 0.22 2704 -0.06 0.17 0.13
(0.8) (0.08) (0.57) (0.02)
55 Essential Oils -10.46 1.34 0.13 -0.13* 0.35 2344
(6.4) (1.73) (0.17) (0.04)
Table 5:  Non-linear Least Squares Estimates of Import Demand
CES DIST - d0 DIST - d1 LANG R2 OBS Dist (mean) Dist(sd) LANG Mean s.d.
Volume Effects Ad-valorem equivalent Residual (price premium)
56 Fertilizers -1.55 0.38 2.78 0.76 0.18 453
(1.21) (0.8) (2.32) (1.03)
57 Plastics In Primary -6.85* 0.22* 1.2* -0.07* 0.34 2775 0.22 0.11 -0.07 0.22 0.17
(0.43) (0.06) (0.24) (0.03)
58 Plastics In Nonprimary -7.57* 0.49* 0.55* -0.18* 0.38 2171 0.49 0.34 -0.18 0.21 0.16
(0.83) (0.17) (0.21) (0.04)
59 Chemical Materials nes -7.3* 0.13 0.51 -0.07* 0.26 3362 -0.07 0.24 0.18
(0.67) (0.13) (0.53) (0.03)
61 Leather manufactures -9.25* 0.05 0.66 -0.02 0.36 1001 0.18 0.14
(1.01) (0.13) (1.66) (0.04)
62 Rubber Manufactures -7.87* 1.63 0.25 -0.12* 0.33 2891 -0.12 0.23 0.18
(3.01) (1.18) (0.19) (0.06)
63 Cork And Wood Manufactures -11.04 2.47 0.12 -0.01 0.40 1741
(12.58) (4.54) (0.22) (0.07)
64 Paper, Paperboard -3.7* -0.31 -0.24 -0.06 0.29 4544 0.48 0.45
(0.77) (0.21) (0.14) (0.03)
65 Textile Yarn -8.32* 0.1* 0.58* -0.04* 0.27 14384 0.10 0.07 -0.04 0.21 0.17
(0.29) (0.05) (0.29) (0.01)
67 Iron And Steel -2.93* -0.30 -0.27 -0.05 0.28 6024 0.52 0.48
(0.81) (0.24) (0.18) (0.03)
68 Nonferrous Metals -7.26* 0.13 0.85 -0.07* 0.26 2839 -0.07 0.27 0.21
(0.63) (0.08) (0.48) (0.03)
71 Power Generating Machinery -9.08* 0.22 0.44 -0.15* 0.38 2937 -0.15 0.19 0.15
(0.92) (0.14) (0.32) (0.02)
72 Machinery Specialized -9.51* 0.16* 0.56* -0.04* 0.35 7444 0.16 0.11 -0.04 0.16 0.13
(0.43) (0.06) (0.22) (0.01)
73 Metalworking Machinery -9.24* 0.21* 0.55* -0.08* 0.44 3771 0.21 0.15 -0.08 0.15 0.11
(0.57) (0.08) (0.23) (0.02)
Table 5:  Non-linear Least Squares Estimates of Import Demand
CES DIST - d0 DIST - d1 LANG R2 OBS Dist (mean) Dist(sd) LANG Mean s.d.
Volume Effects Ad-valorem equivalent Residual (price premium)
74 General Industrial Machinery -9.18* 0.44* 0.36* -0.11* 0.41 13375 0.44 0.34 -0.11 0.18 0.14
(0.6) (0.11) (0.1) (0.01)
75 Office Machines -3.3* -0.91* 0.01 -0.02* 0.39 2472 -0.02 0.50 0.47
(0.39) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
76 Telecommunications -8.85* -0.09 -0.39* -0.01 0.46 3812 0.20 0.16
(0.67) (0.07) (0.18) (0.02)
77 Electrical Machinery -12.97* 1.67 0.13 -0.15* 0.40 13750 -0.15 0.14 0.11
(4.69) (1.11) (0.08) (0.02)
78 Road Vehicles -3.97* -0.6* -0.09* -0.08* 0.30 2674 -0.60 -0.63 -0.08 0.49 0.53
(0.8) (0.14) (0.04) (0.03)
79 Transport Equip -7.79* 0.08 0.41 -0.09 0.31 947 0.24 0.20
(1.72) (0.29) (1.72) (0.05)
81 Prefabricated Buildings -2.99* -0.56* -0.15 0.02 0.42 1433 0.49 0.46
(1.01) (0.25) (0.09) (0.05)
82 Furniture -5.89* 0.9* 0.45* -0.14* 0.51 2250 0.90 0.68 -0.14 0.25 0.20
(1) (0.41) (0.22) (0.06)
83 Travel Goods -7.35* 0.66 0.29 -0.04 0.56 1296 0.19 0.15
(2.19) (0.66) (0.32) (0.05)
84 Apparel -24.59 4.90 0.04 -0.11* 0.46 11219 -0.11
(17.95) (4.7) (0.03) (0.02)
85 Footwear -6.6* -0.14 -0.30 0.01 0.39 1486 0.26 0.21
(1.44) (0.25) (0.36) (0.04)
87 Scientific Instruments -78.6* 14.73* 0.01* -0.12* 0.43 6405 14.73 14.61 -0.12 0.02 0.02
(1.15) (0.63) (0) (0.02)
88 Photographic Equipment -8.92* 0.14 0.30 -0.06* 0.33 4131 -0.06 0.20 0.17
(1.32) (0.22) (0.52) (0.02)
89 Miscellaneous Manufactures -8.97* 1.22 0.12 -0.15* 0.36 14386 -0.15 0.21 0.16
(2.72) (0.81) (0.08) (0.02)
Table 5:  Non-linear Least Squares Estimates of Import Demand
CES DIST - d0 DIST - d1 LANG R2 OBS Dist (mean) Dist(sd) LANG Mean s.d.
00 Live Animals -4.53 0.58 0.37 -0.08 0.24 196
(3.79) (1.74) (1.15) (0.24)
01 Meat And Meat Products -3.10 -0.81* -0.02 0.00 0.37 464
(1.62) (0.23) (0.04) (0.07)
02 Dairy Products -4.53 -0.52 -0.04 0.16 0.30 499
(3.44) (0.69) (0.11) (0.1)
03 Fish -1.19* -0.94* 0.00 -0.04 0.32 1829 1.35 2.15
(0.22) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
04 Cereals -5.03* -0.15 -0.28 0.07 0.28 1028 0.38 0.33
(2.03) (0.45) (0.59) (0.08)
06 Sugars, Sugar Prep -2.41* 0.08 3.39 -0.10 0.28 728 0.71 0.76
(1.01) (0.15) (2.46) (0.21)
08 Feeding Stuff -58.98* 20.15* 0.01 -0.11 0.20 261 0.03 0.02
(4.66) (5.21) (0.01) (0.25)
09 Misc food products -5.74 0.30 0.28 -0.18* 0.28 998 -0.18
(3.18) (0.96) (0.97) (0.08)
12 Tobacco -7.56* 0.14 0.72 0.18 0.30 192 0.25 0.17
(2.31) (0.5) (2.46) (0.21)
21 Hides, Skins -3.46 -0.43 0.02 -0.10 0.23 257
(6.06) (1.29) (0.13) (0.11)
22 Oil Seeds -3.57* 0.01 2.82 -0.42* 0.38 231 -0.42 0.42 0.39
(1.19) (0.11) (14.34) (0.17)
23 Crude Rubber -38.23 7.27 0.01 0.09 0.27 558
(206.58) (47.51) (0.05) (0.1)
24 Cork And Wood -5.27 0.99 0.35 -0.16 0.25 448
(5.43) (2.32) (0.85) (0.2)
25 Pulp And Waste -5.22 0.25 0.45 -0.21 0.40 151
(5.11) (1.64) (3.33) (0.23)
Volume Effects Ad-valorem equivalent Residual (price premium)
Table 5:  Non-linear Least Squares Estimates of Import Demand
CES DIST - d0 DIST - d1 LANG R2 OBS Dist (mean) Dist(sd) LANG Mean s.d.
Volume Effects Ad-valorem equivalent Residual (price premium)
26 Textile Fibers -5.17* 0.03 1.44 -0.13 0.14 977 0.34 0.29
(0.72) (0.11) (3.06) (0.07)
27 Crude Fertilize 1.43* -0.09 1.67 -0.29 0.25 1393 9.E+05 2.E+07
(0.44) (0.21) (2.51) (0.16)
28 Metalliferous Ores -0.8* -0.66* -0.09* -0.16 0.28 742 -0.66 -0.69 2.35 5.78
(0.36) (0.21) (0.04) (0.18)
29 Crude Animal n.e.s -4.06* 0.00 -1.12 0.02 0.23 1989 0.38 0.32
(0.41) (0.02) (2.08) (0.06)
33 Petroleum, -5.75* 0.08 2.37 -0.22* 0.34 496 -0.22 0.40 0.35
(1.28) (0.12) (1.54) (0.11)
34 Gas, Natural 1.71 -0.75 0.20 0.23 0.54 124
(2.02) (0.51) (0.41) (0.49)
41 Animal Oils -4.06 1.10 0.82 0.52 0.19 127
(3.69) (2.15) (0.94) (0.92)
42  Vegetable Fats -8.20 0.35 0.11 0.05 0.41 481
(10.79) (2.34) (0.74) (0.09)
43 Animal Or Veget fats -4.86* 0.35 0.61 0.05 0.36 252 0.28 0.22
(2.04) (0.63) (1.15) (0.18)
51 Organic Chemical -8.08* 0.1* 1.35* 0.00 0.27 7037 0.10 0.04 0.21 0.16
(0.35) (0.03) (0.32) (0.02)
52 Inorganic Chemicals -2.03* 0.53* 1.41* 0.03 0.23 3705 0.53 0.21 0.77 0.95
(0.4) (0.25) (0.43) (0.12)
53 Dyeing, Tanning -7.35* 0.22 0.41 -0.05 0.33 2524 0.21 0.16
(0.94) (0.19) (0.39) (0.03)
54 Pharmaceuticals -10.09* 0.09 0.59 -0.06* 0.22 2704 -0.06 0.17 0.13
(0.8) (0.08) (0.57) (0.02)
55 Essential Oils -10.46 1.34 0.13 -0.13* 0.35 2344
(6.4) (1.73) (0.17) (0.04)
Table 5:  Non-linear Least Squares Estimates of Import Demand
CES DIST - d0 DIST - d1 LANG R2 OBS Dist (mean) Dist(sd) LANG Mean s.d.
Volume Effects Ad-valorem equivalent Residual (price premium)
56 Fertilizers -1.55 0.38 2.78 0.76 0.18 453
(1.21) (0.8) (2.32) (1.03)
57 Plastics In Primary -6.85* 0.22* 1.2* -0.07* 0.34 2775 0.22 0.11 -0.07 0.22 0.17
(0.43) (0.06) (0.24) (0.03)
58 Plastics In Nonprimary -7.57* 0.49* 0.55* -0.18* 0.38 2171 0.49 0.34 -0.18 0.21 0.16
(0.83) (0.17) (0.21) (0.04)
59 Chemical Materials nes -7.3* 0.13 0.51 -0.07* 0.26 3362 -0.07 0.24 0.18
(0.67) (0.13) (0.53) (0.03)
61 Leather manufactures -9.25* 0.05 0.66 -0.02 0.36 1001 0.18 0.14
(1.01) (0.13) (1.66) (0.04)
62 Rubber Manufactures -7.87* 1.63 0.25 -0.12* 0.33 2891 -0.12 0.23 0.18
(3.01) (1.18) (0.19) (0.06)
63 Cork And Wood Manufactures -11.04 2.47 0.12 -0.01 0.40 1741
(12.58) (4.54) (0.22) (0.07)
64 Paper, Paperboard -3.7* -0.31 -0.24 -0.06 0.29 4544 0.48 0.45
(0.77) (0.21) (0.14) (0.03)
65 Textile Yarn -8.32* 0.1* 0.58* -0.04* 0.27 14384 0.10 0.07 -0.04 0.21 0.17
(0.29) (0.05) (0.29) (0.01)
67 Iron And Steel -2.93* -0.30 -0.27 -0.05 0.28 6024 0.52 0.48
(0.81) (0.24) (0.18) (0.03)
68 Nonferrous Metals -7.26* 0.13 0.85 -0.07* 0.26 2839 -0.07 0.27 0.21
(0.63) (0.08) (0.48) (0.03)
71 Power Generating Machinery -9.08* 0.22 0.44 -0.15* 0.38 2937 -0.15 0.19 0.15
(0.92) (0.14) (0.32) (0.02)
72 Machinery Specialized -9.51* 0.16* 0.56* -0.04* 0.35 7444 0.16 0.11 -0.04 0.16 0.13
(0.43) (0.06) (0.22) (0.01)
73 Metalworking Machinery -9.24* 0.21* 0.55* -0.08* 0.44 3771 0.21 0.15 -0.08 0.15 0.11
(0.57) (0.08) (0.23) (0.02)
Table 5:  Non-linear Least Squares Estimates of Import Demand
CES DIST - d0 DIST - d1 LANG R2 OBS Dist (mean) Dist(sd) LANG Mean s.d.
Volume Effects Ad-valorem equivalent Residual (price premium)
74 General Industrial Machinery -9.18* 0.44* 0.36* -0.11* 0.41 13375 0.44 0.34 -0.11 0.18 0.14
(0.6) (0.11) (0.1) (0.01)
75 Office Machines -3.3* -0.91* 0.01 -0.02* 0.39 2472 -0.02 0.50 0.47
(0.39) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
76 Telecommunications -8.85* -0.09 -0.39* -0.01 0.46 3812 0.20 0.16
(0.67) (0.07) (0.18) (0.02)
77 Electrical Machinery -12.97* 1.67 0.13 -0.15* 0.40 13750 -0.15 0.14 0.11
(4.69) (1.11) (0.08) (0.02)
78 Road Vehicles -3.97* -0.6* -0.09* -0.08* 0.30 2674 -0.60 -0.63 -0.08 0.49 0.53
(0.8) (0.14) (0.04) (0.03)
79 Transport Equip -7.79* 0.08 0.41 -0.09 0.31 947 0.24 0.20
(1.72) (0.29) (1.72) (0.05)
81 Prefabricated Buildings -2.99* -0.56* -0.15 0.02 0.42 1433 0.49 0.46
(1.01) (0.25) (0.09) (0.05)
82 Furniture -5.89* 0.9* 0.45* -0.14* 0.51 2250 0.90 0.68 -0.14 0.25 0.20
(1) (0.41) (0.22) (0.06)
83 Travel Goods -7.35* 0.66 0.29 -0.04 0.56 1296 0.19 0.15
(2.19) (0.66) (0.32) (0.05)
84 Apparel -24.59 4.90 0.04 -0.11* 0.46 11219 -0.11
(17.95) (4.7) (0.03) (0.02)
85 Footwear -6.6* -0.14 -0.30 0.01 0.39 1486 0.26 0.21
(1.44) (0.25) (0.36) (0.04)
87 Scientific Instruments -78.6* 14.73* 0.01* -0.12* 0.43 6405 14.73 14.61 -0.12 0.02 0.02
(1.15) (0.63) (0) (0.02)
88 Photographic Equipment -8.92* 0.14 0.30 -0.06* 0.33 4131 -0.06 0.20 0.17
(1.32) (0.22) (0.52) (0.02)
89 Miscellaneous Manufactures -8.97* 1.22 0.12 -0.15* 0.36 14386 -0.15 0.21 0.16
(2.72) (0.81) (0.08) (0.02)
Table 6:  Sensitivity to "pooling" level (OLS estimates)
All Goods
# signif. mean price # signif. mean price # signif. mean price
(9 total) coeff premium (62 total) coeff premium (239 total) coeff premium
CES 9 4.79 57 5.57 190 6.91
DIST 4 -0.54 -0.04 35 -0.59 -0.07 109 -1.09 0.07
LANG 4 0.37 0.03 23 0.61 0.04 65 1.36 0.03
ADJ 4 0.25 0.03 16 0.43 0.02 46 -0.45 0.01
Residual 0.42 0.33 0.26
Manufactures: SITC 5-9
# signif. mean price # signif. mean price # signif. mean price # signif. mean price
(5 total) coeff premium (34 total) coeff premium (164 total) coeff premium (670 total) coeff premium
CES 5 5.79 33 6.26 148 7.04 473 8.26
DIST 4 -0.54 -0.07 31 -0.59 -0.11 96 -0.84 -0.09 217 -1.28 -0.05
LANG 4 0.37 0.05 19 0.55 0.05 58 0.78 0.04 130 1.21 0.03
ADJ 4 0.17 0.02 16 0.43 0.03 38 0.39 0.02 73 1.08 0.02
Residual 0.31 0.31 0.25 0.19
Mean coefficient calculated as average over all significant estimates in that set of regressions
Implied price premium calculated as average over all estimates in that set, with insignificant coefficients treated as zeros
2 digit 3 digit
1 digit
4 digit1 digit
2 digit 3 digit
ARGENTINA
























Line length displays size of inner quartile range; circle denotes trade-weighted average rate




















































































Figure 3: Freight and Tariff Rates: Relative Dispersion by 2 dig SITC















Figure 5:  Selection in Shipping and Distance Relationship
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Appendix A:  Data
Imports and Transport Cost Data.
For all listed sources data from 1994 are used in Tables 1-3 and in Figures 1-3.  Data from 1992
are used in Tables 4-7 to provide a better match with tariff data.
US Census Bureau, “US Imports of Merchandise”.  These data report extremely detailed
customs information on US imports from all exporting countries (approximately 160) from 1974
to the present.  The data are reported at the 10 digit Harmonized System level (approximately
15300 goods categories). For comparability to other national data, these are concorded to 5-digit
SITC using the concordance found in Feenstra (1996).  Data include the valuation of imports,
inclusive and exclusive of freight and insurance charges, shipment quantity (by count and by
weight), transportation mode, district of entry into the US, and duties paid.  Goods are valued
FAS, or “free alongside ship” meaning that freight charges include loading and unloading
expenses.
Statistics New Zealand, “New Zealand’s Imports”.  Available on CD from 1988-1997, reports
imports by 5 digit SITC (approximately 3000 goods) and exporting country, including CIF and
CVD (equivalent to FAS, or "free alongside ship") valuation and shipment weight.
ALADI Secretariat, “Latin American Trade”.  Reports imports of Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Paraguay, and Uruguay from 1991-1994 at the 6 digit Harmonized System coding
(approximately 3000 goods).  These are concorded to the 5-digit SITC classification using the
concordance in Feenstra (1996) for comparability.  Data include exporter, value of imports,
weight, freight charges and insurance charges (separately).  Freight charges are based on FOB
("free on board" - exclusive of loading costs") valuation of goods.  For overland transport within
the ALADI countries it appears that the freight field has a zero value.  This is because charges
are only incurred between exit and entry ports, and these are the same for overland transport.
Note, however, that this does not change the relative valuation of freight charges across export
partners.  All trade incurs some overland shipping from factory to exporting port and from
importing port to location of consumption and these costs are missing from all the data.  One can
then think of the observed values as a distribution that is simply shifted to the left relative to the
true set of values.
US Department of Transportation, “Transborder Surface Freight Data”.  These data are only
used in Table 3 to construct estimates of the shape of freight rates between the US and Canada.
Also based on Census data, these data are restricted to North American surface trade, that is, all
trade between the US, Mexico and Canada not transported by air or ocean vessel.  US imports
are reported at the 2-digit Harmonized system and include value, quantity, freight and insurance,
detailed modal data (rail, truck, pipeline, etc.) origin and destination states and provinces, and




The industry standard for measuring bilateral distance is the "Great Circle" straight-line distance
between partner countries, which may involve polar transit or travel that intersects a continent.
We improve on this in two ways.  First, for pooled estimates in Table 3 and for Tables 4-7, we
use port-to-port distances constructed by forcing shipments to round continental bodies. The
difference can be substantial in some cases. As an example, German goods shipped to the US
east coast are approximately straight-line, whereas goods shipped to the US west coast must
transit through the Panama Canal – roughly doubling the straight line distance.
For Table 3 estimates on US imports by mode, we use US Census data on US District of Entry,
which can be used to separate imports coming into Hawaii from those entering Miami, Boston
and Los Angeles. A common complaint with Census data on US district of entry (for imports) or
exit (for exports) is that these districts do not necessarily capture the ultimate US consumer or
the original US producer of traded goods.   This is not a concern here as we are primarily
interested in the measured cost of freight in getting the goods to the entry point where customs
officials stop calculating freight charges.
We use the following across modes:
1. Air mode. Use the straight-line distance between the exporting country’s capital city and the
US district of entry.
2. Ocean shipped. Use port-to-port distances as described above.
3. Truck and Rail.  Use straight line distance from provincial capital to US district of entry.
The detailed entry port data for the US are not used in Tables 4-7 or in the pooled regression so
that the data are comparable to New Zealand and Latin American data.
Tariff Data
Bilateral tariff data are available for the seven importers.  While the precise year varies
somewhat across countries, most of the data are from 1990.  The data originally come from the
TRAINS dataset, reported at the 6 digit level of the Harmonized System. Jon Haveman
painstakingly constructed bilateral tariff rates using preference indicators in these data.  See
Haveman, Nair, and Thursby, 1998a,b.
In regressions using tariff rates we match the tariff schedule to the exporter and (6 digit HS)
commodity to generate a tariff rate.  We then concord the 6-digit HS data to 5-digit SITC data.
In cases where more than one HS category matches a 5-digit SITC category we calculate a
weighted average tariff rate for that exporter.   There is a fairly close match between these
systems so the concordance is straightforward and little averaging is needed.
